Value Judgments and Economics Expertise

Abstract

This paper tackles the problem of the demarcation of value judgments in economic expertise. Is it possible to disentangle values from facts, or neutral scientific assertions from value-laden judgments, in the context of economic expertise? If not, why not? And if it is, under what conditions? First, drawing on concepts from analytic philosophy, the paper highlights the interdependencies between descriptive, evaluative, and prescriptive judgments. Second, drawing notably on social studies of science, the paper proposes a definition of 'expertise', and translates this into a list of successive stages wherein these different types of judgments are involved. A backward analysis of these stages is provided in order to identify where values stand, and who holds them. Third, reconsidering the positions of neutrality in economics (Mongin 2006), the paper defends the 'weak non-neutrality' view in the context of expertise, and concludes with reflections on what could be done to address the problem of democratic legitimacy raised by the difficulty of demarcation.

Values in Welfare economics

“…Those values and goals should certainly not be swept under the carpet. They may even be specified as transparently as possible, as I have previously claimed in applying the "description as choice" argument to the axiomatic approach of formal welfarism (Baujard 2013). We said above that the use of axiomatics is able to strive towards being value-free as it conveys values which are not held by the scientist: this proposal might be acceptable if confined within a theory.…”

“…Each notion is consistent with the formal welfarist framework, while also setting specific constraints upon it; it corresponds to distinct social theories of justice. Well-being could designate utility, 5 or primary goods, resources, advantages, opportunities, capabilities, etc. (see section 3 in this chapter, and chapter on well-being)…”

Values in Welfare Economics

“…Each notion is consistent with the formal welfarist framework, while also setting specific constraints upon it; it corresponds to distinct social theories of justice. Well-being could designate utility, 5 or primary goods, 5 Utility on the one hand may refer to a state of mind. Hedonic theories, as in classical Utilitarianism, consider well-being as the experience of happiness, the balance between pains and pleasures, or as flourishing.…”

Utilitarianism and Anti-Utilitarianism

“…The ordinalist revolution that affected economic science from Pareto to the thirties watershed has totally modified the definition of utility in economics: in order to secure economics' status as a science, it was necessary to exclude the hedonist interpretation of utility and favor the preference interpretation; this move was completed by the revealed preference theory (Baujard 2013). A similar evolution occurred in the utilitarian philosophical literature, especially in the second part of the twentieth century.…”

“…As a consequence, expert decisions based on utilitarianism would legitimately proceed from the will of individuals, although in fact implemented by an expert. The possibility of such a demarcation is, however, doubtful (Baujard 2013). In the end, this objection again recalls the issue of the lack of democracy in the elaboration of actual policy recommendations and the implementation of utilitarian policies.…”