Value Judgments and Value Neutrality in Economics

Abstract

The paper analyses economic evaluations by distinguishing evaluative statements from actual value judgments. From this basis, it compares four solutions to the value neutrality problem in economics. After rebutting the strong theses about neutrality (normative economics is illegitimate) and non-neutrality (the social sciences are value-impregnated), the paper settles the case between the weak neutrality thesis (common in welfare economics) and a novel, weak non-neutrality thesis that extends the realm of normative economics more widely than the other weak thesis does. Copyright (c) The London School of Economics and Political Science 2006.

The Mechanism of Transaction: Value Equilibrium Model of A Bargaining Game Between Two Rational Agents

“…A transaction is not only simple exchange buyer's money with seller's commodity, but also cooperation game between the buyer and the seller. But A new model of transaction need a new definition of rationality, the rationality postulate is generally considered the core of modern economics [1][2] [3][4] [5], but economists have long expressed dissatisfaction with the complex models of strict rationality [1] [2][3] [4], so in theoretical research, modeling a transaction is a complex problem unsolved [6] [7][8] [9] [10].…”

The Normative Foundations of Scarcity

“…This positivist idea is predicated on the possibility of sharp separation of facts and values. Mongin (2006) and Putnam (2002) give several examples of statements which generate substantial controversy regarding whether they should be classified as facts or values. At the same time, it is easy to give examples of value judgments which command substantially greater consensus.…”

“…It does not follow that all sentences can be classified into one or the other category; see Mongin (2006) for several illustrations. Deeper examination, as in Hausman and McPherson (2006), shows that facts and values are entangled and cannot be separated in a large class of statements central to economic theories.…”

Under Risk, Over Time, Regarding Other People: Language and Rationality within Three Dimensions

“…This presupposition has been expressed and contested in many ways throughout the last century in philosophy (see, e.g., Marchetti and Marchetti 2017) as well as in economics (see, e.g., Blaug 1998;Mongin 2006b;Castro Caldas and Neves 2012;Reiss 2017). The methodological orientation taken in this paper follows one existing criticism of the fact/value dichotomy: the entanglement thesis of Hilary Putnam, Vivian Walsh and Amartya Sen (see Putnam and Walsh 2011).…”

“…One methodological presupposition underlying both uses of the positive/normative distinction is the fact/value dichotomy, i.e., that the (positive) observation of facts is in principle independent of (normative) values (Mongin 2006b). This presupposition has been expressed and contested in many ways throughout the last century in philosophy (see, e.g., Marchetti and Marchetti 2017) as well as in economics (see, e.g., Blaug 1998;Mongin 2006b;Castro Caldas and Neves 2012;Reiss 2017).…”