Varieties of Nature in Hegel and McDowell

Halbig, Christoph

doi:10.1002/9781444306736.ch5

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“…University of Massachusetts, Boston steven.levine@umb.edu Notes 1 See, for example, the exchange between Halbig 2008 andMcDowell 2008. 2 See Boyle forthcoming. 3 All forms of therapy involve some positive theorizing, for it is an open question which reminder with respect to the form of the rational animal is most effective at liberating us from mystery and anxiety.…”

Section: Steven Levinementioning

confidence: 99%

McDowell, Hegel, and Habits

Levine¹

2015

Hegel Bulletin

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In his debate with Dreyfus McDowell defends the 'pervasiveness thesis', the thesis that rational mindedness pervades the lives of rational animals, their perceptual experiences and exercises of agency. To counter this idea, Dreyfus introduces the notion of 'social standing': the culturally inculcated yet non-conceptual sense of the appropriate distance that one should stand from another person. McDowell claims that social standing is not a counter-example to the pervasiveness thesis because it stands altogether outside of it. In this paper I argue that this response is a misstep, that we should see social standing as falling within the pervasiveness thesis. While such phenomena do not normally fall within the scope of a subject's practical self-knowledge they are still pervaded by rational mindedness. They are because the dispositions and habits that comprise our second nature, although not the realization of an exercise of conceptual capacities, can be brought within the scope of a subject's practical self-knowledge and in fact changed, and this is enough to establish that they are pervaded by rational mindedness. I argue that we can find a picture like this in a Hegelian-pragmatist account of our habitual second nature.

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Section: Steven Levinementioning

confidence: 99%

McDowell, Hegel, and Habits

Levine¹

2015

Hegel Bulletin

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“…Some commentators have found in Hegel a conception of second nature much like McDowell's (See for example Pinkard 2012 and Testa 2010). Others disagree that there is a conception of second nature equivalent to that of McDowell's to be found in Hegel (See for example Halbig 2008). I will not enter this debate here.…”

Section: Hegel Liberal Naturalism and The Origins Of A Dichotomymentioning

confidence: 99%

Hegel and Naturalism

Papazoglou¹

2012

Bull. Hegel Soc. G.B.

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In the recent Hegel literature there has been an effort to portray Hegel's philosophy as compatible with naturalism, or even as a form of naturalism (see for example Pippin 2008 and Pinkard 2012). Despite the attractions of such a project, there is, it seems to me, another, and potentially more interesting way of looking at the relationship of Hegel to naturalism. Instead of showing how Hegel's philosophy can be compatible with naturalism, I propose to show how Hegel's philosophy offers a challenge to naturalism. Naturalism has become the dominant ideology in much of contemporary analytic philosophy (Kim 2003: 84), but also within other disciplines. Evolutionary psychology and behavioral genetics, which attract a lot of media attention, attempt to explain the human mind and human behavior in purely naturalistic terms, usually in terms of the biological past and makeup of humans (Pinker 2002). Philosophy's task is, among other things, to examine the assumptions of human practices including its own. In that vein I am interested in showing how Hegel can be seen as someone offering a challenge to our contemporary philosophical culture and its underlying naturalist premise.Of course that Hegel never explicitly talks about naturalism in his writings already presents us with the problem of risking anachronism. The other great problem is the fact that naturalism is an elusive philosophical position. There are a few different versions of the key theses of naturalism, so that if our aim is to diagnose Hegel's philosophy as naturalist or anti-naturalist it would seem we have to pick which version of naturalism we are going to work with.

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2011

The Formation of Reason

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Varieties of Nature in Hegel and McDowell

Cited by 4 publications

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McDowell, Hegel, and Habits

McDowell, Hegel, and Habits

Hegel and Naturalism

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