Variety of Evidence

Landes, Jürgen

doi:10.1007/s10670-018-0024-6

Cited by 12 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…(This idea is also discussed in philosophy under the labels of robustness analysis and triangulation. ) VET has intuitive appeal and has been favorably appraised by philosophers (Wimsatt, ; see Landes, , for a discussion). Take, for instance, the case for climate change, which we take to be robust as it incorporates evidence from a variety of different disciplines.…”

Section: Philosophical Issues Raised By the Replicability Crisismentioning

confidence: 99%

Philosophy of science and the replicability crisis

Romero

2019

Philosophy Compass

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Replicability is widely taken to ground the epistemic authority of science. However, in recent years, important published findings in the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences have failed to replicate, suggesting that these fields are facing a “replicability crisis.” For philosophers, the crisis should not be taken as bad news but as an opportunity to do work on several fronts, including conceptual analysis, history and philosophy of science, research ethics, and social epistemology. This article introduces philosophers to these discussions. First, I discuss precedents and evidence for the crisis. Second, I discuss methodological, statistical, and social‐structural factors that have contributed to the crisis. Third, I focus on the philosophical issues raised by the crisis. Finally, I discuss several proposals for solutions and highlight the gaps that philosophers could focus on.

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Section: Philosophical Issues Raised By the Replicability Crisismentioning

confidence: 99%

Philosophy of science and the replicability crisis

Romero

2019

Philosophy Compass

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“…Out of this discussion the VET does not emerge vindicated, this is impossible given the apparent VET failures reported in Bovens and Hartmann (2002), Osimani and Landes (2020), Landes (2020b) and Fitelson (1996), but the VET is at least not (yet) troubled by gradual source independence. All conditional probabilities not explicitly set to zero, are always assumed to be nonextreme lying the open interval (0, 1).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 81%

The variety of evidence thesis and its independence of degrees of independence

Landes

2020

Synthese

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The intuitive Variety of Evidence Thesis states that, ceteris paribus, more varied evidence for a hypothesis confirms it more strongly than less varied evidence. Recent Bayesian analyses have raised serious doubts in its validity. Claveau suggests the existence of a novel type of counterexample to this thesis: a gradual increase in source independence can lead to a decrease in hypothesis confirmation. I show that Claveau's measure of gradual source independence suffers from two unsuspected types of inconsistencies. I hence put forward a more natural measure of gradual source independence which is not plagued by inconsistencies. Claveau's counterexamples to the variety of evidence thesis disappear with the measure I suggest. I hence argue that my measure is preferable and that this thesis does at least not seem to be troubled by Claveau's arguments.

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“…In Bovens and Hartmann (2003), this notion of unreliability has been formalised in a Bayesian network model for determining the confirmation a body of evidence provided by a group of agents bestows on the hypothesis of interest. Their model has found applications in the philosophy of science concerning the epistemological Variety of Evidence Thesis (Bovens and Hartmann 2002;Claveau 2013;Claveau and Grenier 2019;Stegenga and Menon 2017;Landes 2020b, a), which states that varied evidence for a hypothesis confirms it more strongly than less varied evidence, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, it has been employed in Hahn et al (2016) for modelling social debates of findings in climate science, the philosophy of economics Casini and Landes (2020) and (the philosophy of) medicine (Abdin et al 2019;Landes et al 2018;De Pretis et al 2019;.…”

Section: Background and Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Assessed Strength of Agents’ Bias

Landes

Osimani

2020

J Gen Philos Sci

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Recent work in social epistemology has shown that, in certain situations, less communication leads to better outcomes for epistemic groups. In this paper, we show that, ceteris paribus, a Bayesian agent may believe less strongly that a single agent is biased than that an entire group of independent agents is biased. We explain this initially surprising result and show that it is in fact a consequence one may conceive on the basis of commonsense reasoning.

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Variety of Evidence

Cited by 12 publications

References 30 publications

Philosophy of science and the replicability crisis

Philosophy of science and the replicability crisis

The variety of evidence thesis and its independence of degrees of independence

On the Assessed Strength of Agents’ Bias

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