Vaulting Intuition: Temkin's Critique of Transitivity

Voorhoeve, Alex

doi:10.1017/s0266267113000321

Cited by 23 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…This would have far-reaching consequences, for example, in modelling economic behaviour'. The philosophers Handfield and Rabinowicz are no less alarmed by: 'the havoc in axiology which would result from abandoning the transitivity or the asymmetry of better-than' (Handfield and Rabinowicz 2018: 13), or in this journal see also Voorhoeve's (2013) critique of the rare philosopher to question transitivity, Larry Temkin (2012). 6 We argue the consequences of the STP are not necessarily as dire, just as the consequences from accepting earlier paradoxes were not.…”

Section: The Voting Paradox : : : With a Single Voter?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The voting paradox … with a single voter? Implications for transitivity in choice under risk

Butler

Blavatskyy

2019

Economics and Philosophy

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The voting paradox occurs when a democratic society seeking to aggregate individual preferences into a social preference reaches an intransitive ordering. However it is not widely known that the paradox may also manifest for an individual aggregating over attributes of risky objects to form a preference over those objects. When this occurs, the relation ‘stochastically greater than’ is not always transitive and so transitivity need not hold between those objects. We discuss the impact of other decision paradoxes to address a series of philosophical and economic arguments against intransitive (cyclical) choice, before concluding that intransitive choices can be justified.

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Section: The Voting Paradox : : : With a Single Voter?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The voting paradox … with a single voter? Implications for transitivity in choice under risk

Butler

Blavatskyy

2019

Economics and Philosophy

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“…Following Voorhoeve, who makes a proposal (see note 6 above) that runs into an analogous complaint, I believe this inferential benefit is overrated by Temkin, and that the more modest transitivity property is still very important. The transitivity of better than entails that our decisions can be consistent with betterness, in the sense that we are guaranteed that at least one option is not worse than any other option (Voorhoeve , pp. 409–10).…”

Section: Implications For Transitivitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Another proposal is canvassed by Alex Voorhoeve (, pp. 414–16), who suggests that we can individuate the states of affairs that stand in betterness relation more finely.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Essentially Comparative Value Does Not Threaten Transitivity

Handfield

2016

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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The essentially comparative conception of value entails that the value of a state of affairs does not depend solely upon features intrinsic to the state of affairs, but also upon extrinsic features, such as the set of feasible alternatives. It has been argued that this conception of value gives us reason to abandon the transitivity of the better than relation. This paper shows that the support for intransitivity derived from this conception of value is very limited. On its most plausible interpretations, it merely provides a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for intransitivity. It is further argued that the essentially comparative conception of value appears to support a disjunctive conclusion: there is incommensurability of value or betterness is not transitive. Of these two alternatives, incommensurability is preferable, because it is far less threatening to our other axiological commitments.

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“…x neither morally better than y, nor morally worse, nor equally good (Adler 2012: 43-4). The rational permissibility of intransitive preferences is on much shakier ground (Voorhoeve 2013).…”

Section: Aggregating Moral Preferences: a Quasi-arrovian Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Aggregating Moral Preferences

Adler¹

2016

Economics and Philosophy

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Abstract:Preference-aggregation problems arise in various contexts. One such context, little explored by social choice theorists, is metaethical. 'Idealadvisor' accounts, which have played a major role in metaethics, propose that moral facts are constituted by the idealized preferences of a community of advisors. Such accounts give rise to a preference-aggregation problem: namely, aggregating the advisors' moral preferences. Do we have reason to believe that the advisors, albeit idealized, can still diverge in their rankings of a given set of alternatives? If so, what are the moral facts (in particular, the comparative moral goodness of the alternatives) when the advisors do diverge? These questions are investigated here using the tools of Arrovian social choice theory.

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Vaulting Intuition: Temkin's Critique of Transitivity

Cited by 23 publications

References 19 publications

The voting paradox … with a single voter? Implications for transitivity in choice under risk

The voting paradox … with a single voter? Implications for transitivity in choice under risk

Essentially Comparative Value Does Not Threaten Transitivity

Aggregating Moral Preferences

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