We analyze democratic accountability in open economies based on different hypotheses about political evaluations and government responsiveness. Specifically, we assess whether citizens primarily rely on government policies or if they focus on economic outcomes resulting from these policies to evaluate governments. Our empirical analysis relies on Bayesian structural vector autoregression models for the British economy, aggregate monthly measures of public opinion, and economic evaluations from . We find that voters continuously monitor and strongly respond contemporaneously to changes in monetary and fiscal policies, but less to changes in macroeconomic outcomes. Voters also respond to policies differently when institutions change. When the Bank of England became politically independent, citizens shifted their attention toward fiscal policy, and the role of monetary policy in their evaluations decreased significantly. Finally, politicians respond to voting behavior by adjusting their policies in a sensible way. When vote intentions and approval decrease, the government reacts to the public by adjusting fiscal policy and, before the Bank of England became independent, also monetary policy. * Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Conference on the Political Economy of International Finance (PEIF), Federal Reserve Bank Atlanta, February 9, 2007, and the Seminar of the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics, Princeton University, October 25, 2007. Brandt's and Freeman's research was sponsored by the National Science Foundation under grants numbers SES-0351179, SES-0351205 and SES-0540816. Sattler's research was supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation under grant number 101412-101962/1. Harold Clarke kindly provided data on subjective personal expectations. We thank William Bernhard, Mark Hallerberg, Jude Hays, Tim Hellwig, Patrick Kuhn, David Leblang, Angela O'Mahony, Thomas Plümper, Dennis Quinn, Ken Scheve, the anonymous referees and the editors for comments. The authors are solely responsible for the contents.
1It is a fundamental idea of modern democratic politics that citizens evaluate their government and hold it accountable for its performance. Citizens can do this in different ways. In a recent, major contribution, Duch and Stevenson (2008) applied a competence model to this problem. They stressed the importance of outcomes, which are realizations of policies subject to random shocks and thus containing noisy signals about policymakers' competence. An alternative hypothesis is that citizens primarily evaluate policies that governments choose to draw conclusions about the quality of government decisions.We use an empirical framework that allows us to examine these hypotheses. It is based on a Bayesian structural vector autoregression model for the British economy, aggregate public opinion, and economic evaluations. We use this framework to examine the mechanism connecting observable and unobservable government policies, economic performance and citizens' evaluations of e...