Vehicle Scrappage and Gasoline Policy

Jacobsen, Mark R.; Benthem, Arthur van

doi:10.3386/w19055

Cited by 34 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 10 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Standards that increase vehicle efficiency also reduce the marginal cost of driving and may encourage additional vehicle miles traveled, with corresponding fuel consumption, emissions, congestion, and accidents (Linn, 2016;Parry, Walls, & Harrington, 2007), and they may result in reduced vehicle weight, affecting collision fatality rates Anderson & Auffhammer, 2013). The standards also affect the used car market, which can incentivize consumers to keep old cars longer and can have a regressive effect (Jacobsen & Benthem, 2015;Davis & Knittel, 2016). A key justification for fuel economy policy is that consumers may undervalue future fuel savings when purchasing a vehicle and thus benefit if fleet efficiency improves, but the evidence for this is mixed (e.g.…”

Section: Pre-printmentioning

confidence: 99%

Alternative-fuel-vehicle policy interactions increase U.S. greenhouse gas emissions

Jenn

Azevedo

Michalek

2019

Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The transportation sector is currently the largest contributor of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the United States, and light-duty vehicles produce the majority of transportation emissions. Federal standards for fleet-averaged vehicle GHG emission rates and their corresponding corporate average fuel economy standards cap GHG emissions of the US light-duty vehicle fleet. In addition, two key policies aim to encourage a future fleet transition to alternative fuel vehicle (AFV) technologies: (1) incentives that treat AFVs favorably in the federal GHG standard, and (2) state zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) policy, which mandates AFV sales in some states. While each of these AFV policies can encourage AFV adoption, we show that net GHG emissions increase when both policies are present simultaneously. Specifically, we estimate changes in life cycle GHG emissions and gasoline consumption, relative to a pure federal fleet GHG standard (without AFV incentives or mandates), resulting from the introduction of (1) AFV incentives in federal fleet GHG policy, (2) state ZEV mandates, and (3) the combination of the two. We find that under fairly general conditions the combined AFV policies produce higher GHG emissions than either policy alone. This result is a consequence of state mandates increasing AFV sales in the presence of federal incentives that relax the fleet GHG standard when AFVs are sold. Using AFV sales projections from the Energy Information Administration and the California Air Resources Board, we estimate that the combined policies produce an increase on the order of 100 million tons of CO2 emissions cumulatively for new passenger cars sold from 2012 through 2025 relative to a pure GHG standard. AFV incentives in the GHG standard conflate policy goals by encouraging AFV adoption at the cost of higher fleet GHG emissions, and they permit even higher fleet GHG emissions when other policies, such as the ZEV mandate, increase AFV adoption.

show abstract

Section: Pre-printmentioning

confidence: 99%

Alternative-fuel-vehicle policy interactions increase U.S. greenhouse gas emissions

Jenn

Azevedo

Michalek

2019

Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Consumer sustainability preferences (Attari, DeKay, Davidson, & Bruin, 2010;Daziano & Chiew, 2012;Feng, Fullerton, & Gan, 2013;Gould & Golob, 1997;Li, Clark, Jensen, Yen, & English, 2013;Marigny Research Group, 2006;Sheth, Sethia, & Srinivas, 2011 (Jacobsen & van Benthem, 2013;Marell, Davidsson, & Gärling, 1995) Public transit  Influence of gas price on transit ridership (Lane, 2010(Lane, , 2012 Passenger perspective on train delay (Cheng & Tsai, 2014)…”

Section: Appendix a Answering Questions About Pev Consumersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consumer Behavior and the Plug-In Electric Vehicle Purchase Decision Process: A Research Synthesis

Taylor

Fujita

2018

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Executive SummaryThis report synthesizes consumer behavior research as it pertains to the plug-in electric vehicle (PEV) purchase decision process. The purpose is to clarify what is known about the vital role consumers play in the U.S. PEV market as it matures to become less policy-reliant and more representative of the U.S., both spatially and demographically. A more representative PEV market will: help OEMs recoup more of their R&D investments in PEVs; help American consumers access the economic and performance benefits of PEVs; and help the U.S. become more energy independent while improving air quality-related public health and reducing greenhouse gas emissions.This report draws heavily from the marketing literature for its organization and insights. Section 2 introduces the standard five steps of the purchase decision process used in consumer behavior research and introduces important internal and external factors that are likely to affect that decision process. Section 3 provides a review of transportation data and literature that is structured around these five purchase decision steps, namely problem recognition, search (both internal and external), alternative evaluation, purchase, and post-purchase behavior. The final section of the report, Section 4, highlights cross-cutting themes in consumer behavior research that are relevant to the maturation of the U.S. PEV market. It also provides a table that compiles a variety of research topics that would fill important knowledge gaps about the PEV purchase decision process.The report identifies several challenges on the consumer side of the PEV purchase process. These include experience gaps and the need for consumers to make high investments of time and effort in the PEV purchase decision-making process and in post-purchase use. As is true for many purchase decisions, there is potential for negative emotions to arise throughout the PEV purchase decision process and for consumers to have negative purchase consequences. The vehicle purchase context can compound some of these challenges and/or differentiate how they play out with respect to PEV purchases versus traditionally-fueled light-duty vehicle purchases. Relevant contextual elements include: time constraints for purchase; rapid technological change in both PEVs and traditionally-fueled vehicles; and competition between PEVs and traditionallyfueled vehicles that are familiar, high-quality, and prominently advertised by OEMs.Despite these challenges, the report makes clear that there is an increasing value proposition for PEV purchase for a growing group of consumers based on the economic, performance, convenience, psycho-social, and societal benefits of PEVs. To increase public awareness of this value proposition, the report emphasizes the importance of emotional appeals and highlights the possible role of PEV owners in shaping these appeals.iii

show abstract

“…The first apparent difference to the present article's focus is that the kind of policy that I consider should lead to higher energy efficiency. This is also the kind of policy that Jacobsen and van Benthem (2015) analyze. They apply the Gruenspecht reasoning to fuel economy standards.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Compared to the Gruenspecht (1982) and Jacobsen and van Benthem (2015) contributions, my article's focus is on a theoretical model in which the investment and scrap decisions are derived from optimization behavior, such that the choice of energy efficiency and the investment decision depend on the energy price. Minimum-efficiency standards are derived and discussed for varying intensities instead of assuming constant elasticities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Adverse Effect of Energy-Efficiency Policy

Voss

2019

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

I analyze energy-efficiency policy as a prescription of a minimum-efficiency standard for energyusing household goods like cars, building insulation, and home appliances. Such a policy has two effects. At the intensive margin, a household that invests will choose a more efficient device. At the extensive margin, there will be more households that choose not to invest at all. Thus, additional to and different from rebound effects, energy-efficiency policy may have unintended consequences. I analyze the equilibrium effects of a minimum-efficiency standard, taking price adjustments and household heterogeneity into account. A moderate minimumefficiency standard increases demand for efficiency-enhancing household capital goods, and reduces energy demand. More stringent policy is shown to be less effective or even counterproductive. For the case of a fixed supply of efficiency-enhancing capital, it is shown that minimum-efficiency standards increase equilibrium energy demand. Finally, I analyze which households benefit from minimum-efficiency standards and which ones lose. A standard induces investing households to expend more for household capital and less for energy. The wedge between the induced expenditures and the private optimum is analyzed as a deadweight loss.Abstract I analyze energy-efficiency policy as a prescription of a minimum-efficiency standard for energy-using household goods like cars, building insulation, and home appliances. Such a policy has two effects. At the intensive margin, a household that invests will choose a more efficient device. At the extensive margin, there will be more households that choose not to invest at all. Thus, additional to and different from rebound effects, energy-efficiency policy may have unintended consequences. I analyze the equilibrium effects of a minimum-efficiency standard, taking price adjustments and household heterogeneity into account. A moderate minimum-efficiency standard increases demand for efficiency-enhancing household capital goods, and reduces energy demand. More stringent policy is shown to be less effective or even counterproductive. For the case of a fixed supply of efficiency-enhancing capital, it is shown that minimum-efficiency standards increase equilibrium energy demand. Finally, I analyze which households benefit from minimum-efficiency standards and which ones lose. A standard induces investing households to expend more for household capital and less for energy. The wedge between the induced expenditures and the private optimum is analyzed as a deadweight loss. JEL Codes

show abstract

Vehicle Scrappage and Gasoline Policy

Cited by 34 publications

References 10 publications

Alternative-fuel-vehicle policy interactions increase U.S. greenhouse gas emissions

Alternative-fuel-vehicle policy interactions increase U.S. greenhouse gas emissions

Consumer Behavior and the Plug-In Electric Vehicle Purchase Decision Process: A Research Synthesis

The Adverse Effect of Energy-Efficiency Policy

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About