Veranderingen in de servicerol van commissarissen in Nederland

Abstract

MAB s e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 7 4 2 0

How Internal and External Supervision Impact the Dynamics between Boards and Top Management Teams and TMT Reflexivity

“…Second, we expect that our results are applicable for all board structures because the monitoring tasks studied in this paper are similar for members of the supervisory board in a twotier board and non-executive directors in a one-tier board. However, some caution should be applied when generalizing our findings, since we have studied insurance companies with a two-tier board, that are specific to the Netherlands and other Rhineland countries (Bezemer et al, 2007). Moreover, there might be some limitation to our measure of Board-TMT relationship conflict as we only included the ratings provided by supervisory board members of the conflict in order to prevent common source issues.…”

“…To ensure that TMTs reflect on their decisions, their outcomes are supervised internally, by their supervisory boards 1 within their own organization with the main task to monitor whether TMT actions are in the organization interest (Fama & Jensen, 1983;Jensen & Meckling, 1976;Walsh & Seward, 1990), and externally, by independent supervisory institutions with the legal task and authority to monitor TMT strategic decision making to ensure stability in the larger 1 Our study mainly reflects the situation in a two-tier board structure, in which a management board or Top Management Team (TMT, including the CEO) is formally and operationally separated from a supervisory board (Bezemer, Maassen, van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2007). For reasons of readability we refer to the two studied management bodies, as the supervisory board (board), and the Top Management Team (TMT, e.g, Boivie et al, 2016), respectively.…”

“…This situation is formally different from one-tier board structures where these functions are combined in one management body; the board of directors with executive and non-executive directors. Despite these formal differences, the main monitoring tasks performed by internal supervisory bodies are similar for both members of supervisory boards and nonexecutives directors in a board of directors (Bezemer et al, 2007). Hence, when we refer to internal supervision this might refer to the monitoring activities performed by both non-executives in a board of directors and by members of a supervisory board.…”

De rol van de commissaris

“…Het grote verschil in de ervaren onafh ankelijkheid verdient nader onderzoek. De verschillen kunnen voortkomen uit een verschillende perceptie wat de criteria voor onafh ankelijkheid zijn (zie hiervoor ook Kroeze, 2005;Bezemer et al, 2007;De Bos et al, 2008), of kunnen veroorzaakt zijn door bijvoorbeeld het wel of niet nastreven van winst door de organisaties, het bestuur en het toezicht hierop (waarbij de eigen belang nastrevende bestuurder uit de agency theory (Fama en Jensen, 1983) geacht wordt minder aanwezig te zijn bij non-profi t organisaties en er daardoor ook minder gewicht aan onafh ankelijkheid van de toezichthouder wordt gegeven).…”