2011
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-011-9291-1
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Verisimilitude and Belief Revision. With a Focus on the Relevant Element Account

Abstract: The expansion or revision of false theories by true evidence does not always increase their verisimilitude. After a comparison of different notions of verisimilitude the relation between verisimilitude and belief expansion or revision is investigated within the framework of the relevant element account. We are able to find certain interesting conditions under which both the expansion and the revision of theories by true evidence is guaranteed to increase their verisimilitude.

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Cited by 20 publications
(11 citation statements)
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“…For this reason, it is surprising that it violates condition P3: that logically stronger truths are more informative, and hence more truthlike, than logically weaker truths. This principle, which Oddie (2013) calls "the value of content for truths", was defended by Popper (1963) and is typically satisfied by content-based and consequence-based accounts, like that of Schurz andWeingartner (1987, 2010). As for the similarity based approaches, it is defended by Niiniluoto (1987) and rejected by Oddie (1986Oddie ( , 2013.…”
Section: Discussion and Comparison With Other Accountsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…For this reason, it is surprising that it violates condition P3: that logically stronger truths are more informative, and hence more truthlike, than logically weaker truths. This principle, which Oddie (2013) calls "the value of content for truths", was defended by Popper (1963) and is typically satisfied by content-based and consequence-based accounts, like that of Schurz andWeingartner (1987, 2010). As for the similarity based approaches, it is defended by Niiniluoto (1987) and rejected by Oddie (1986Oddie ( , 2013.…”
Section: Discussion and Comparison With Other Accountsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In this connection, Schurz has proposed a further interesting distinction, that between conjunctive and disjunctive approaches to theory representation (Schurz and Weingartner 2010;Schurz 2011). The key idea is that the way in which propositions, or theories, are represented in the first place can have significant implications on how their relative verisimilitude is defined and assessed.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…5 There have been more analyses of the relationship between verisimilitude and AGM belief revision. See, in particular, the Erkenntnis september 2011 special issue on the relationship between verisimilitude and belief revision, especially Baltag and Smets ([2011]); Cevolani et al ([2011]); Kuipers ([2011]); Renardel de Lavalette and Zwart ([2011]); and Schurz ([2011]). 6 Oddie ([Forthcoming]) argues that verisimilitude theory is in conflict with a certain approach within Bayesian epistemology known as the 'accuracy framework' (Joyce ([1998]); Pettigrew ([2016]), but he does not argue that the conflict lies with the Bayesian framework itself.…”
Section: Problems With the Law Of Likelihoodmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Schurz and Weingartner (2010) use instead conjunctive normal forms, where theories are conjunctions of content elements. Schurz (2011) observes that the "basic feature approach" developed by Roberto Festa and Gustavo Cevolani also belongs to the conjunctive camp. 18 It is restricted to c-theories or convex conjunctive theories, which are generalizations of constituents in propositional logic, i.e.…”
Section: Convergence: Conjunctive Theoriesmentioning
confidence: 99%