Vers une meilleure prise en compte des défaillances en cascade au sein des réseaux franciliens interdépendants face aux crues majeures

Abstract

Cet article a pour objectif de discuter des conditions de choix et de mise en œuvre d'une démarche d'identification et d'analyse des défaillances des réseaux techniques franciliens résultant des liens d'interdépendances face à une crue majeure de la Seine. Après avoir présenté les conclusions découlant d'un état de l'art des démarches à visée opérationnelle et discuté des difficultés de mise en œuvre associées à ces démarches, nous proposons des critères pour la sélection ou la construction d'une démarche appropriée à un contexte donné. Nous nous penchons ensuite sur le cas de l'Île-de-France face au risque de crue majeure en regard de nos questions scientifiques et opérationnelles, en identifiant ses spécificités et les travaux déjà menés et en cours. L'initiative collaborative de partage de cartographies de « vulnérabilités » est discutée en tant qu'outil potentiel d'amélioration de la prise en compte et de la gestion des interdépendances et des défaillances en cascade potentielles, et une méthodologie partagée pour la construction, le partage et la prise en compte est proposée.

Hazards, Infrastructure Networks and Unspecific Resilience

“…The exposure of the electric network to flooding is significant, as most of the power and communication lines are underground. The shutdown of 22 wastewater treatment plants for about 6 days impacted the drinking water networks [40], and the power outages affected more than 16,000 customers and hampered public transportation signal systems, public lighting, urban heating and water services beyond the flooded areas [37,38]. Other services such as waste collection were also temporarily interrupted in some places because of flooded roads, lack of fuel or lack of electrical energy powering the waste treatment plants.…”

“…Linear infrastructures carrying flux (such as a highway or a commuter rail track) run parallel to power lines, telecommunication cables, gas pipelines and water pipes [57]. The one-way direction of water networks offers fewer options in case of any failures for the Île-de-France [40]. In light of above, Table 3 presents some options for high flux.…”

Analysis of Cascading Effects on Key Urban Networks During Flooding in Brazzaville, Congo

“…The increase in risks relating to the operation of these networks is linked in particular to urbanisation, ageing infrastructures, the reduction in State control and the multiplication of players due to liberalisation and privatisation, but also to the increased use of information technology, the increase in interconnections and links between stakeholders and systems, and the ongoing quest for efficiency and profitability. We are also witnessing an increase in the number of threats, from natural hazards, particularly as a result of current climate change [3].…”

“…Networks are therefore made up of lines: sections of pipes, cables and roads, as well as production centers (drinking water production plant, power station), transfer or storage centers (reservoirs, electrical transformers, pressure-reducing stations) and consumption centers (customers, consumers, users). This arborescent vision is relevant for distribution networks, but another vision of networks recommends linking all the points in the city as exhaustively as possible [3]. This vision corresponds more to transport or information networks in which all the points are both transmitters and receivers.…”

Study on Invulnerability of Material Emergency Transportation System Based on Three-Layer Interdependent Network

“…e risk of cascading failure can increase when the correlation among the systems becomes complicated. Different from a single network, the interdependent network can take into account the correlation among multiple systems and is more practical in the study of material emergency transportation networks [6][7][8].…”