2017
DOI: 10.1093/ajae/aax071
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Vertical Ownership and Export Performance: Firm‐Level Evidence from the Food Industry

Abstract: This article examines whether ownership arrangements between food firms and intermediaries improve the export performance of the former. We develop a theoretical model of trade with vertically‐linked industries whereby upstream manufacturers compete in export markets and may decide to acquire ownership stakes in an intermediary. The model highlights how more productive firms succeed in managing the double marginalization problem and in reducing the costs of exporting through forward acquisition. The prediction… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1

Citation Types

2
14
0
1

Year Published

2019
2019
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
8
1

Relationship

1
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 27 publications
(17 citation statements)
references
References 31 publications
2
14
0
1
Order By: Relevance
“…Nevertheless, running the proposed model herein reveals that backward shareholding will increase the final price and thus hurt the sales volume. Regarding performance of the players, Concerning the performance of the players, Gaigné et al (2018) proved their benefits could be quite significant through applying forward acquisitions. In an N-to-One assembly system, Fu et al (2018) considered both upstream and downstream Stackelberg game, concluding that such a shareholding system enables the downstream firm to share the profit of the upper ones and the latter to gain needed resources, which in turn eventually benefits the whole supply chain.…”
Section: Forward and Backward Shareholdingsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nevertheless, running the proposed model herein reveals that backward shareholding will increase the final price and thus hurt the sales volume. Regarding performance of the players, Concerning the performance of the players, Gaigné et al (2018) proved their benefits could be quite significant through applying forward acquisitions. In an N-to-One assembly system, Fu et al (2018) considered both upstream and downstream Stackelberg game, concluding that such a shareholding system enables the downstream firm to share the profit of the upper ones and the latter to gain needed resources, which in turn eventually benefits the whole supply chain.…”
Section: Forward and Backward Shareholdingsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Au-delà des variations des coûts des facteurs de production, la compétitivité-coût dépend également de l'évolution de la productivité. Différents travaux soulignent le rôle-clé de la productivité des firmes agroalimentaires dans leur réussite à l'exportation (Gaigné et al, 2017), en accord avec les nombreuses études empiriques (Crozet et Mayer, 2007). Or, contrairement au secteur agricole, on observe un essoufflement des gains de productivité dans les industries agroalimentaires au cours de ces vingt dernières années.…”
Section: Une Productivité Stagnante Et Des Taux De Marge Déclinantsunclassified
“…Brito et al [5] find that when the products are homogeneous, equity holding by downstream firms in the upstream firm benefits the consumers. Gaigné et al [16] and Fu et al [14] study equity holding in a supply chain with multiple upstream firms and one downstream firm. Gaigné et al [16] show that equity holding by upstream firms in the downstream firm benefits the entire supply chain.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Gaigné et al [16] and Fu et al [14] study equity holding in a supply chain with multiple upstream firms and one downstream firm. Gaigné et al [16] show that equity holding by upstream firms in the downstream firm benefits the entire supply chain. Fu et al [14] show that the impact of equity holding by the downstream firm in upstream firms highly depends on power structures.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%