Veto Players, Agenda Control and Cabinet Stability in 17 European Parliaments, 1945–1999

Saalfeld, Thomas

doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-5809-9_6

Cited by 4 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Third, as an internal condition, we added the ‘number of partners variable’ ( H5 ), in accordance with the literature on veto players (Alemán and Tsebelis, 2011; Saalfeld, 2011; Tsebelis, 2002). These works assume that an increase in the number of players dilutes the likely concentration of vetoes, making the outcome more insecure and unpredictable.…”

Section: Bicameral Majorities and Coalition Agreement Durationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The Numbers of Partners (PART) Corresponding to H5: following the literature on veto players (Tsebelis 2002(Tsebelis , 2006 and their effects on coalition duration. I incorporated the findings of Saalfeld (2011) who showed that the increase of one new member into a coalition government should increase in 29% the probability for a coalition break. Thus, I calibrated this condition following these findings, from the more favourable to the maintaining of the coalition, to the less favourable, resting 29 % for every new member, beginning by 2…”

Section: Fundingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Bicameralism and Coalition Cabinets in Presidential Polities: A configurational analysis of the coalition formation and duration processes

Albala

2017

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

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For too long, scholars have studied coalitions under presidential regimes as they did under parliamentarism: assuming that the executive needed to look for allies in only one chamber. However, symmetric bicameralism has made such assumption untenable. As a matter of fact, bicameralism, particularly symmetrical bicameralism, as it operates under presidential regimes, may entail significant constraints for policymaking and coalition duration. Indeed, controlling one of the two chambers may not be sufficient for the president to ensure policy approvals. This article focuses on the 28 coalition cabinets with a bicameral framework in Latin America since the return of democracy. I show that bicameralism dramatically affects the composition of the coalitions as the absence of a majority in both chambers engenders a post-electoral agreement round. Moreover, I show that when a coalition holds some kind of majority in both houses, the coalition agreement lasts longer.

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Section: Bicameral Majorities and Coalition Agreement Durationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Fundingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bicameralism and Coalition Cabinets in Presidential Polities: A configurational analysis of the coalition formation and duration processes

Albala

2017

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

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“…In addition, as an internal condition, I added a variable indicating the number of partners to a coalition, drawing on the concept of 'veto players' (Alemán and Tsebelis, 2011;Saalfeld, 2011). In theory, an increase in the number of players within a coalition dilutes the concentration of veto powers, making the outcome more insecure and unpredictable.…”

Section: Conceptualizing the Timing Of Coalition Formation Under Presidential Regimesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We incorporated the findings of Saalfeld (2011) who showed that the increase of one new member into a coalition government should increase in 29% the probability for a coalition break. Thus, we calibrated this condition following these findings, from the more favourable to the maintaining of the coalition, to the less favourable, resting 29 % for every new member, beginning by 2 -1: Two coalition members (the lowest number for forming a coalition) -0.…”

Section: Fundingmentioning

confidence: 99%

When do coalitions form under presidentialism, and why does it matter? A configurational analysis from Latin America

Albala

2020

Politics

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This article proposes a new approach to the study of coalition formation in presidential regimes. Drawing on a dataset covering 33 Latin American governments, the article shows that coalition cabinets are, mostly, the product of pre-electoral agreements. I present a six-stage timing of coalition agreements, including four degrees of earliness. Then, I challenge this consideration with the most common – institutional – arguments from the literature about the survival of coalitions in presidential regimes. The findings are quite interesting since they point out that earlier agreements are relevant conditions for enduring coalitions. Moreover, and surprisingly, I show that the institutional argument seems to have been overrated by the literature.

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“…Existing studies test predictions of the theory on policy change, predominantly relying on macroeconomic outcome data, such as budget allocations, budget deficits, inflation rates, spending and taxation (for an overview, see Hallerberg ). Among many other applications of veto player theory, scholars study the effect of veto players on cabinet stability and duration (Saalfeld ), cabinet formation (Tsebelis & Ha ; Eppner & Ganghof ), discretion of central banks (Bernhard ; Keefer & Stasavage ), economic growth (MacIntyre ), referendums (Hug & Tsebelis ), voter turnout (Carlin & Love ), bureaucratic corruption (Bagashka ), as well as human rights (Lupu ).…”

Section: Veto Players and Policy Change: An Overviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Veto player theory and reform making in Western Europe

Angelova

Bäck

Müller

et al. 2017

European J Political Res

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Veto player theory generates predictions about governments’ capacity for policy change. Due to the difficulty of identifying significant laws needed to change the policy status quo, evidence about governments’ ability to change policy has been mostly provided for a limited number of reforms and single‐country studies. To evaluate the predictive power of veto player theory for policy making across time, policy areas and countries, a dataset was gathered that incorporates about 5,600 important government reform measures in the areas of social, labour, economic and taxation policy undertaken in 13 Western European countries from the mid‐1980s until the mid‐2000s. Veto player theory is applied in a combined model with other central theoretical expectations on policy change derived from political economy (crisis‐driven policy change) and partisan theory (ideology‐driven policy change). Robust support is found that governments introduce more reform measures when economic conditions are poor and when the government is positioned further away from the policy status quo. No empirical support is found for predictions of veto player theory in its pure form, where no differentiation between government types is made. However, the findings provide support for the veto player theory in the special case of minimal winning cabinets, where the support of all government parties is sufficient (in contrast to minority cabinets) and necessary (in contrast to oversized cabinets) for policy change. In particular, it is found that in minimal winning cabinets the ideological distance between the extreme government parties significantly decreases the government's ability to introduce reforms. These findings improve our understanding of reform making in parliamentary democracies and highlight important issues and open questions for future applications and tests of the veto player theory.

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Veto Players, Agenda Control and Cabinet Stability in 17 European Parliaments, 1945–1999

Cited by 4 publications

References 26 publications

Bicameralism and Coalition Cabinets in Presidential Polities: A configurational analysis of the coalition formation and duration processes

Bicameralism and Coalition Cabinets in Presidential Polities: A configurational analysis of the coalition formation and duration processes

When do coalitions form under presidentialism, and why does it matter? A configurational analysis from Latin America

Veto player theory and reform making in Western Europe

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