Veto Players and Institutional Analysis

Abstract

The veto players theory can be used to analyze all political systems regardless of regime (presidential or parliamentary), party system (one-, two-, or multiparty), and type of parliament (unicameral or multicameral). This paper develops the veto players theory to account for a series of important political phenomena: the difference between majoritarian and supermajoritarian institutions; the importance of absenteeism, or of political marginalization; the importance of agenda control and referendums; the reasons for government stability (parliamentary systems) and regime stability (presidential systems); the reasons for independence of bureaucracies, and judicial independence. All these phenomena are analyzed in a coherent way, on the basis of the same framework. Empirical evidence from existing literature corroborating the theory is provided.

Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments

“…Although bicameralism is a frequently found constitutional setting (according to Tsebelis and Money 1997, it can be found in approximately one-third of all legislatures), its economic effects remain underresearched. In their survey paper on bicameralism, Cutrone and McCarty (2006) note that it "has not received the scholarly attention that other legislative institutions have."…”

Austerity in public transport in Europe: The influence of governance

“…In his work Chisholm (1989) shows that different levels of government with high fragmentation can organize transport quite well, even without a single authority coordinating. Tsebelis (Tsebelis, 2000) shows how a spread of (veto) power in a more fragmented governance can affect the ability of the governance system to realized major changes, like in our case substantial budget cuts. Hooghe and Marks (2001) give an excellent overview of the key dilemmas that exist in the cooperation of jurisdictions (cities, municipalities, provinces, departments, regions, states, countries, with an dedicated governance structure) on various levels and their role in the decision-making process.…”

Anglo-Saxon Capitalism in Crisis? Models of Liberal Capitalism and the Preconditions for Financial Stability

“…Here, the presence and relative strength of countervailing powers in the policy-making process is important. The more 'veto players' or 'veto points' there are -i.e., those who can block or modify a given policy -the more difficult it becomes for any single actor to get what they want (Tsebelis 2000). Such players in the countries in our study include electoral, corporate governance and industrial relations systems, which served to shape relations within and between actors in the political system, industry and organized labour.…”