Vice epistemology has a responsibility problem

Battaly, Heather

doi:10.1111/phis.12138

Cited by 16 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…But EIR is also theoretically useful for the epistemic injustice literature. For instance, it holds the promise of helping epistemic injustice theorists solve what Robin McKenna (MS) calls their “responsibility problem.” Inspired by Heather Battaly's (2019) similar problem for vice epistemology, McKenna argues that this problem faces all epistemologies that take seriously the social embeddedness of knowers and the sorts of biases and power relations that come with such embeddedness. Epistemic injustice scholarship is his prime example.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Socialising epistemic risk: On the risks of epistemic injustice

Mitova

2023

Metaphilosophy

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Epistemic risk is of central importance to epistemology nowadays: one common way in which a belief can fail to be knowledge is by being formed in an epistemically risky way, that is, a way that makes it true by luck. Recently, epistemologists have been expanding this rather narrow conception of risk in every direction, except arguably the most obvious one—to enable it to accommodate the increasingly commonplace thought that knowledge has an irreducibly social dimension. This paper fills this lacuna by bringing issues of epistemic injustice to bear on epistemic risk. In particular, it draws on the phenomenon of white ignorance, to sketch a more social notion of epistemic risk, on which the interests of one's epistemic community partly determine whether a belief‐forming procedure is epistemically risky.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Socialising epistemic risk: On the risks of epistemic injustice

Mitova

2023

Metaphilosophy

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“…Before I do, though, note that my discussion is only on the explanation of resistant attitudes and behaviours, rather than engaging issues of blame and responsibility; those are live issues in vice epistemology and are obviously important to our understanding of resisters and our decisions about how to respond to them (cf. Battaly 2019;Cassam 2019, ch. 6).…”

Section: Explanatory Pluralismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multidimensionalism, Resistance, and The Demographic Problem

Kidd

2023

EuJAP

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Linda Martín Alcoff and others have emphasised that the discipline of philosophy suffers from a ‘demographic problem’. The persistence of this problem is partly the consequence of various forms of resistance to efforts to address the demographic problem. Such resistance is complex and takes many forms and could be responded to in different ways. In this paper, I argue that our attempts to explain and understand the phenomenon of resistance should use a kind of explanatory pluralism that, following Quassim Cassam, I call multidimensionalism. I describe four general kinds of resistance and consider varying explanations, focusing on those focused on vices and social structures. I argue that vice-explanations and structural- explanations are both mutually consistent and mutually entailing. If so, there is no need to choose between vice explanations and structural explanations or any other kinds of explanation. We can and should be multidimensionalists: using many together is better.

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“…When analysing agential epistemic vices, a wiser strategy involves exploring the aetiology of their epistemic character, attending to the array of conditions, interactions and structures, which can feed or starve the development of virtues and vices. When epistemic vices are the products of our sustained subjection to epistemically corrupting systems, then we can attribute vices without necessarily wanting to also add blame into the mix (Battaly, 2019).…”

Section: Epistemic Vice and Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic corruption and the research impact agenda

Kidd

Chubb

Forstenzer

2021

Theory and Research in Education

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Contemporary epistemologists of education have raised concerns about the distorting effects of some of the processes and structures of contemporary academia on the epistemic practice and character of academic researchers. Such concerns have been articulated using the concept of epistemic corruption. In this article, we lend credibility to these theoretically motivated concerns using the example of the research impact agenda during the period 2012–2014. Interview data from UK and Australian academics confirm that the impact agenda system, at its inception, facilitated the development and exercise of epistemic vices. As well as vindicating theoretically motivated claims about epistemic corruption, inclusion of empirical methods and material can help us put the concept to work in ongoing critical scrutiny of evolving forms of the research impact agenda.

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Vice epistemology has a responsibility problem

Cited by 16 publications

References 29 publications

Socialising epistemic risk: On the risks of epistemic injustice

Socialising epistemic risk: On the risks of epistemic injustice

Multidimensionalism, Resistance, and The Demographic Problem

Epistemic corruption and the research impact agenda

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