When countries emerge from a civil war, accountability and compensation for harms done are crucial for peacebuilding. However, post-civil war governments face uncertain political contexts, delegation problems, difficulties building trust among former combatants, deficits of central administrative capacity, and incentives to reward supporters. Given these challenges, they are unlikely to be able to fairly distribute financial compensation. In Nepal, the awarding of internationally funded compensation for conflict-related losses provides a very tangible test regarding whether factional opportunism or broader public interest considerations guide post-conflict allocations. We hypothesize that without effective institutions, compensation will be skewed in favour of those in power and not proportional to harms suffered. Using individual-level data, we analyse who benefited from the post-conflict settlement, showing those killed by Maoist perpetrators, those sympathetic to the state and members of the state armed forces were more likely to be compensated, a biased, hence unfavourable, outcome for peacebuilding.