Video on demand: what deepfakes do and how they harm

Harris, Keith Raymond

doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03379-y

Cited by 31 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…If deepfakes and CGI footage alike can lead us to form false beliefs from a video, then do we have any reason to think that the former is in any way more problematic than the latter, at least from an epistemic perspective? Perhaps as Keith Raymond Harris ( 2021 ) puts it, the epistemic concerns with deepfakes are ‘overblown? In some respects, Harris is correct; currently, the time taken to create a sophisticated deepfake is usually longer than CGI footage or a Photoshopped picture, and because they are a relatively new technology the quality of deepfakes can vary significantly.…”

Section: Deepfakes and Digital Fake Barnsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Deepfakes, Fake Barns, and Knowledge from Videos

Matthews

2023

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Recent develops in AI technology have led to increasingly sophisticated forms of video manipulation. One such form has been the advent of deepfakes. Deepfakes are AI-generated videos that typically depict people doing and saying things they never did. In this paper, I demonstrate that there is a close structural relationship between deepfakes and more traditional fake barn cases in epistemology. Specifically, I argue that deepfakes generate an analogous degree of epistemic risk to that which is found in traditional cases. Given that barn cases have posed a long-standing challenge for virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge, I consider whether a similar challenge extends to deepfakes. In doing so, I consider how Duncan Pritchard’s recent anti-risk virtue epistemology meets the challenge. While Pritchard’s account avoids problems in traditional barn cases, I claim that it leads to local scepticism about knowledge from online videos in the case of deepfakes. I end by considering how two alternative virtue-theoretic approaches might vindicate our epistemic dependence on videos in an increasingly digital world.

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Section: Deepfakes and Digital Fake Barnsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 8 There is relatively little work on the epistemology of deepfakes. Notable exceptions include Fallis ( 2020 ), Rini ( 2020 ), Harris ( 2021 ) and Matthews ( 2022 ). …”

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confidence: 99%

Deepfakes, Fake Barns, and Knowledge from Videos

Matthews

2023

Synthese

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“…Consider that the vast majority of extant deepfakes are pornographic (Ajder et al, 2019 ; Cox, 2019 ). While such deepfakes create a host of moral concerns (Harris, 2021 ; Öhman, 2020 ; Paris & Donovan, 2019 ; Young, 2021 : ch. 11), there is reason to think that the epistemic ill-effects of such deepfakes are limited.…”

Section: Two Accounts Of the Epistemic Threat Of Fakesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Let us begin with the limits. Keith Harris ( 2021 ) argues that the epistemic threat of deepfakes is often overstated. This is because the epistemic effects of deepfakes can be substantially mitigated by attention to the channels—including, for some examples, television channels, websites, and Twitter accounts—by which video footage is accessed.…”

Section: The Epistemic Threat Of Fakes: Limits and Defensesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Real Fakes: The Epistemology of Online Misinformation

Harris

2022

Philos. Technol.

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Many of our beliefs are acquired online. Online epistemic environments are replete with fake news, fake science, fake photographs and videos, and fake people in the form of trolls and social bots. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the threat that such online fakes pose to the acquisition of knowledge. I argue that fakes can interfere with one or more of the truth, belief, and warrant conditions on knowledge. I devote most of my attention to the effects of online fakes on satisfaction of the warrant condition, as these have received comparatively little attention. I consider three accounts of the conditions under which fakes compromise the warrant condition. I argue for the third of these accounts, according to which the propensity of fakes to exist in an environment threatens warrant acquisition in that environment. Finally, I consider some limitations on the epistemic threat of fakes and suggest some strategies by which this threat can be mitigated.

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Ethical Problems of the Use of Deepfakes in the Arts and Culture

Cejudo

2023

The International Library of Ethics, Law and Technology

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Video on demand: what deepfakes do and how they harm

Cited by 31 publications

References 23 publications

Deepfakes, Fake Barns, and Knowledge from Videos

Deepfakes, Fake Barns, and Knowledge from Videos

Real Fakes: The Epistemology of Online Misinformation

Ethical Problems of the Use of Deepfakes in the Arts and Culture

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