Violence, bribery, and fraud: the political economy of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa

Collier, Paul; Vicente, Pedro C.

doi:10.1007/s11127-011-9777-z

Cited by 227 publications

(184 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…18 Collier 2009Davenport 2007;Snyder 2000. 19 Zakaria 1997.;Collier 2009;Collier and Vicente 2012;Robinson and Torvik 2009. 20 Lewis-Beck 1990;Lindberg 2006a;Lipset 1983;Seligson and Booth 1995;Sisk 1995.…”

Section: Democracy Elections and Repressionmentioning

confidence: 99%

When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?

Hafner-Burton

Hyde²,

Jablonski

2013

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

304

173

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When are governments most likely to use election violence, and what factors can mitigate government incentives to resort to violence? How do the dynamics of election violence differ in the pre-and post-election periods? Our central argument is that an incumbent's fear of losing power as the result of an election, as well as institutionalized constraints on the incumbent's decisionmaking powers, are pivotal in her decision to use election violence. While it may seem obvious to suggest that incumbents use election violence in an effort to fend off threats to their power, it is not obvious how to gauge these threats, and a central purpose of our research is to identify sources of information about the incumbent's popularity that can help predict the likelihood of election violence. The observable implications of our argument are tested using newly available cross-national evidence on elections, government use of pre-and post-election violence, and post-election protests from 1981 to 2004.2 When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence? 1 On paper, Azerbaijan is a multiparty democracy, and has held periodic multi-party presidential and parliamentary elections since the country regained independence in 1991. Despite the nominal existence of democratic institutions, tactics of electoral manipulation used by the government include overt election fraud, violence, and intimidation. Opposition supporters, opposition candidates, and journalists risk torture, arbitrary arrest, and political imprisonment-all strategies the government uses to "win" elections. 2 For example, in the run up to the 2005 parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan, facing the possibility that the "colour revolutions" of Georgia and Ukraine would spread, the government arrested journalists and attempted to prevent the opposition from campaigning.The police detained over a thousand activists before the election, and jailed hundreds without cause. 3 After the election, amid accusations of fraud, the government announced that the ruling party won an overwhelming majority, 4 Opposition supporters began to protest the results, assembling more than 7,000 people. Riot police and military forces disbursed the protesters using clubs and water cannons, and several opposition politicians were beaten. 5 In the end, despite international and domestic backlash, the incumbent remained in power. 6 Government-sponsored election violence-events in which incumbent leaders and ruling party agents employ or threaten violence against the political opposition or potential voters before, during, or after elections-is common. 4(including threats of violence such as harassment), we present and test a theory of when an incumbent government is likely to use election violence prior to or after an election. Our central argument is that an incumbent's fear of losing power as the result of an election, as well as institutionalized constraints on the incumbent's decision-making powers, are pivotal in her decision to use election violence. While it may seem obvious t...

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Section: Democracy Elections and Repressionmentioning

confidence: 99%

When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?

Hafner-Burton

Hyde²,

Jablonski

2013

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

304

173

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“…6 For insightful discussions of the economics of vote markets in a range of differenct contexts, see Baland andRobinson (2007, 2008), Collier and Vicente (2012), Stokes (2005) or Heckelman (1995.…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Democratization and the size of government: evidence from the long 19th century

Aidt

Jensen

2013

Public Choice

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We study the consequences of franchise extension and ballot reform for the size of government in Western Europe between 1820 and 1913. We find that franchise extension exhibits a U-shaped association with revenue per capita and a positive association with spending per capita. Instrumental variables estimates, however, suggest that the U-shaped relationship may be non-causal and our fixed effects estimates point to substantial crosscountry heterogeneity. Further, we find that the secret ballot did not matter for tax revenues per capita but might have expanded the size of government relative to GDP. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL-Code: D700, P160.

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“…In line with a strategic interpretation, several studies place electoral violence within the same category of illicit strategies of electoral manipulation as vote-buying and electoral fraud (cf. Bratton 2008;Collier and Vicente 2012;Schedler 2002). 13 Arriola and Johnson 2012;Höglund 2009;Linebarger and Salehyan 2012. 14 Hafner-Burton, Hyde and Jablonski 2014; see also Arriola and Johnson (2012) on power-sharing settlements and institutions in post-conflict societies.…”

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confidence: 99%

Electoral Institutions and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa

Fjelde¹,

Höglund²

2014

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

132

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Political violence remains a pervasive feature of electoral dynamics in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, even where multiparty elections have become the dominant mode of regulating access to political power. With cross-national data on electoral violence in Sub-Saharan African elections between 1990 and 2010, this article develops and tests a theory that links the use of violent electoral tactics to the high stakes put in place by majoritarian electoral institutions. It is found that electoral violence is more likely in countries that employ majoritarian voting rules and elect fewer legislators from each district. Majoritarian institutions are, as predicted by theory, particularly likely to provoke violence where large ethno-political groups are excluded from power and significant economic inequalities exist.

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Violence, bribery, and fraud: the political economy of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa

Cited by 227 publications

References 24 publications

When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?

When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?

Democratization and the size of government: evidence from the long 19th century

Electoral Institutions and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa

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