Viral Sovereignty or Sequence Etiquette? Asian Science, Open Data, and Knowledge Control in Global Virus Surveillance

Abstract

On several occasions, the People’s Republic of China refused to share influenza viruses isolated on their territory with the World Health Organization pandemic flu surveillance system. Scholars in STS and allied disciplines have described these disputes as examples of growing conflict between global health norms of free exchange and Asian state claims of viral sovereignty. However, the discussion has largely overlooked the fact that laboratories in China freely shared genetic sequence data from isolated viruses, even when they refused to ship physical samples, a fact that complicates the opposition of open data and viral sovereignty with the different material forms of the physical sample and the nucleotide sequence. This article provides a comprehensive comparison of the heterogeneous circulations of influenza virus samples and virus gene sequences in global health influenza surveillance and argues this difference is rooted in the different knowledge-control regimes designed for exchanging samples and sequences. Engaging with debates on the position of Asian science within global scientific circulations, the article suggests that Asian scientists confront a multiplicity of global scientific infrastructures and do not necessarily rely on the authority of nation-state sovereignty to reshape global exchanges.

Bioinformational diplomacy: Global health emergencies, data sharing and sequential life

“…GISAID instead requires all new users to initially undertake a one-time process of positive identification (GISAID, 2011). This identification mechanism makes it easier for scientists to discover, and properly acknowledge, those who originally contributed the data -improving 'sequence etiquette' and building greater trust in data sharing (Fearnley, 2020). That process of positively identifying the contributors and users of data also gives GISAID the basis to enforce the rules set forth in the database access agreement.…”

“…At that point GISAID decided, for the first time, to open up its sharing platform beyond influenza data and to include genetic sequence data about SARS-CoV-2 as well. This enabled scientists in other countries to quickly use such shared sequence data to begin the process of developing new diagnostics and vaccines for the virus (Fearnley, 2020). Following that decision, moreover, there has been a steady and significant increase in the sharing of such SARS-CoV-2 pathogen sequence data through GISAID.…”

“…The hard-fought diplomatic frameworks governing the international sharing of benefits derived from genetic resources were mostly negotiated on the basis of still having to exchange biological materials, that is, physical samples of viruses and other microbes (Halabi, 2019;Hinterberger and Porter, 2015). As sequence data become an increasingly powerful informational resource, it remains unclear what options will remain for LMICs to secure more equitable access to the benefits accruing from 'their' genetic resources in future (Fearnley, 2020). There is growing uncertainty as to whether they will be able to develop other diplomatic strategies moving forward, or whether their negotiating positions will ultimately become eroded due to the emergence of pathogen sequence data.…”

Rebels, vigilantes and mavericks: heterodox actors in global health governance

“…COVID-19 has dramatically elevated GISAID’s international profile, however. In response to the pandemic, GISAID expanded its platform to also host sequence data for SARS-CoV-2 (Fearnley, 2020). Over the course of the pandemic GISAID then managed to amass more than 13 million SARS-CoV-2 sequences at the time of writing.…”

After biosovereignty: The material transfer agreement as technology of relations

“…I investigate three legitimating frameworks that inform Indonesia’s position of increasingly employing MTAs, namely 1) to gain political leverage in the governance of global bioscience, 2) to bring biolegal complexity to the project of ‘commoning’, and 3) to force change in the production of international scientific authorship. By focusing on MTAs, my article aims to contribute to the existing literature that challenge or complicate the notion of ‘biosovereignty’ (Elbe, 2021; Fearnley, 2020). As I will show, the deployment of legal instruments by the state are not to be understood only as forms of control over biological resources.…”