Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington: Twenty-five years of public choice and political science

Mitchell, William

doi:10.1007/bf00115751

Cited by 77 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…She also helped building the concept of common property goods (OSTROM;OSTROM, 1977). iii What we herein call the Public Choice is defined in Mitchell (1988).…”

Section: Additional Considerations and Research Challengesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vincent and Elinor Ostrom: Two Confluent Trajectories for the Governance of Common Property Resources

2017

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The aim of the current theoretical article is to demonstrate the importance of Vincent Ostrom in the intellectual history of his wife Elinor Ostrom, especially in studies on the governance of common property resources grounded in the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework (IAD). Three elements that demonstrate Vincent's importance to this perspective are herein highlighted and analyzed, namely: the concern in pointing out the natural characteristics of resources as a determining factor in the development of effective institutional arrangements; the proposal of polycentric institutions; and the construction of a rationality model. Lastly, the paper listed some questions that may help structuring a positive research agenda in this field, with repercussions on contemporary themes and on important public policies.

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“…She also helped building the concept of common property goods (OSTROM;OSTROM, 1977). iii What we herein call the Public Choice is defined in Mitchell (1988).…”

Section: Additional Considerations and Research Challengesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vincent and Elinor Ostrom: Two Confluent Trajectories for the Governance of Common Property Resources

2017

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“…5 However, for the present purposes we will limit the focus to his work on social choice 5 On Riker's role as the founder of the "Rochester School" or "positive political theory", see Mitchell (1988) and Amadae and Bueno de Mesquita (1999). analysis and, more narrowly, to three questions or themes emanating from Liberalism against populism and central to both Riker's legacy and the analysis of how democracy works in those situations wherein three or more decision-makers are to choose between three or more alternatives. Riker summarized what he felt were the central insights: [I have shown] that no method of voting could be said to amalgamate individual judgments truly and fairly because every method violates some reasonable canon of fairness and accuracy.…”

Section: Rikerian Perspectives On Empirical Social Choicementioning

confidence: 99%

Empirical social choice: an introduction

Kurrild-Klitgaard

2014

Public Choice

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The year 2012 was the 30th anniversary of William H. Riker's modern classic Liberalism against populism (1982) and is marked by the present special issue. In this introduction, we seek to identify some core elements and evaluate the current status of the Rikerian research program and its empirical applications. Special attention is given to three phenomena and their possible empirical manifestations: The instability of social choice in the form of (1) the possibility of majority cycles, (2) the non-robustness of social choices given alternative voting methods, and (3) the possibility of various forms of manipulation of the decisions (heresthetics). These topics are then connected to the contributions to the current special issue.Keywords: Social choice; Condorcet's Paradox; voting theory; voting paradoxes; preferences; heresthetics.[Even] if an omniscient observer, call him Zeus, knew the true tastes of every voter, it would still be impossible for him to predict the social choice or the product of aggregating preferences unless he also knew the method of aggregation. This means that the social choice depends not simply on the wills of individuals, but also on the method used to summarize these wills.

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“…However, a growing body of work in economics and political science had been looking at the behavior of legislators and bureaucracies. Particularly influential was the work of the "Rochester school" of political science on legislative politics (Mitchell, 1988), and books by Gordon Tullock (1965) and William Niskanen (1971) on bureaucracy. Buchanan's published work pretty much ignored the supply side until about the mid-1970s.…”

Section: The Supply Side Of the Public Sectormentioning

confidence: 99%

Nobel Laureate: On James Buchanan's Contributions to Public Economics

Römer

1988

Journal of Economic Perspectives

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The 1986 Nobel Prize in economic science was awarded to James Buchanan. What the Nobel committee recognized in making its award was Buchanan's central role in the gradual transformation of the way economists and political scientists study governments and their relationship to the governed. In this essay, I will focus on Buchanan's contributions to public economics, especially his linking of economic and political concerns. Table 1 lists the 21 works by James Buchanan cited in this essay.

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Virginia, Rochester, and Bloomington: Twenty-five years of public choice and political science

Cited by 77 publications

References 34 publications

Vincent and Elinor Ostrom: Two Confluent Trajectories for the Governance of Common Property Resources

Vincent and Elinor Ostrom: Two Confluent Trajectories for the Governance of Common Property Resources

Empirical social choice: an introduction

Nobel Laureate: On James Buchanan's Contributions to Public Economics

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