2016
DOI: 10.1109/tmc.2015.2506578
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Virtualization of 5G Cellular Networks as a Hierarchical Combinatorial Auction

Abstract: Abstract-Virtualization has been seen as one of the main evolution trends in the forthcoming fifth generation (5G) cellular networks which enables the decoupling of infrastructure from the services it provides. In this case, the roles of infrastructure providers (InPs) and mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) can be logically separated and the resources (e.g., subchannels, power, and antennas) of a base station owned by an InP can be transparently shared by multiple MVNOs, while each MVNO virtually owns th… Show more

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Cited by 170 publications
(79 citation statements)
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References 36 publications
(61 reference statements)
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“…There are three different types of business models for network slicing which are B2B, B2C, and B2B2C [6]. In addition, several solutions for efficiently supporting network resource virtualization [7] and resource allocation by using auction approaches [8] have been proposed. They have been designed to improve the quality of experience (QoE) of mobile users and network utilization.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There are three different types of business models for network slicing which are B2B, B2C, and B2B2C [6]. In addition, several solutions for efficiently supporting network resource virtualization [7] and resource allocation by using auction approaches [8] have been proposed. They have been designed to improve the quality of experience (QoE) of mobile users and network utilization.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We introduce the Vickery-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, which restricts that bidders must follow the truthful valuation for bidding [9]. After obtaining the current iteration shadow prices λ λ λ (t) , µ µ µ (t) , ν ν ν (t) and assigned weights ω i , σ j of both UEs and BSs, MVNOs and InPs calculating their bidding strategies x m , y n separately according to their true valuation of bidding utility: (4) and (6).…”
Section: A the Bidding Strategiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…After obtaining the current iteration shadow prices λ λ λ (t) , µ µ µ (t) , ν ν ν (t) and assigned weights ω i , σ j of both UEs and BSs, MVNOs and InPs calculating their bidding strategies x m , y n separately according to their true valuation of bidding utility: (4) and (6). As the optimal solution is satisfied by solving KKT conditions of primal problem, we solve the utility of both each MVNO m and InP n by (B1) and (B2), which are calculated by the pre-negotiated price p mn between m and n and iteration shadow price λ λ λ (t) , µ µ µ (t) , ν ν ν (t) produced by constraints (8) and (9). We can see the details in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2.…”
Section: A the Bidding Strategiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…A resource allocation in virtualized small cell networks with full duplex self-backhauls is formulated in [18] as a mixed combinatorial optimization problem to maximize the total utility of all mobile virtual network operators. Zhu and Hossain [19] design a hierarchical combinatorial auction mechanism for the resource allocation problem in wireless virtualization. A resource allocation problem for virtualized full-duplex relaying networks is formulated in [20] to maximize the total utility.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%