Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth

Kallestrup, Jesper; Pritchard, Duncan

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00495.x

Cited by 75 publications

(50 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…2 For more on the notion of epistemic dependence, see Kallestrup and Pritchard (2011, 2012, 2013 and Pritchard (forthcominga). Note that this notion is rooted in an earlier distinction between intervening and environmental epistemic luck, and an associated critique of robust virtue epistemology-see Pritchard (2009aPritchard ( , b, 2012a and Pritchard et al (2010, chap.…”

Section: The Nature Of Knowledgementioning

confidence: 98%

Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat

Pritchard

2016

Synthese

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This paper explores how a certain theory of knowledge-known as antiluck virtue epistemology-can account for, and in the process shed light on, the notion of an epistemic defeater. To this end, an overview of the motivations for anti-luck virtue epistemology is offered, along with a taxonomy of different kinds of epistemic defeater. It is then shown how anti-luck virtue epistemology can explain: (i) why certain kinds of putative epistemic defeater are not bona fide; (ii) how certain kinds of epistemic defeater are genuine in virtue of exposing the subject to significant levels of epistemic risk; and (iii) how certain kinds of epistemic defeater are genuine in virtue of highlighting how the subject's safe cognitive success does not stand in the appropriate explanatory relationship to her manifestation of relevant cognitive ability.Keywords Epistemology · Knowledge · Epistemic defeaters · Anti-luck virtue epistemology Introductory remarksIt is incumbent upon any theory of knowledge to explain how it handles cases involving epistemic defeaters. To this end, I will be offering an account of how my preferred theory of knowledge-anti-luck virtue epistemology-can incorporate this epistemic notion. In particular, I will be arguing that this proposal is well-placed to account for the various different types of epistemic defeater (and can also explain why some related phenomena do not qualify as genuine cases of epistemic defeat). Although my claim is not the ambitious one that anti-luck virtue epistemology is uniquely placed to account B Duncan Pritchard

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Section: The Nature Of Knowledgementioning

confidence: 98%

Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat

Pritchard

2016

Synthese

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“…The only difference between our two agents' circumstances concerns their modal environment, in that there is a close possibility of error that's applicable on twin earth which isn't applicable on earth. The upshot of this difference in the 10 For more on epistemic twin earth cases, and epistemic dependence more generally, see Pritchard & Kallestrup [2011;. Such cases, and the general phenomenon of epistemic dependence, build on Pritchard's earlier distinction between intervening and environmental (epistemic) luck and his associated critique of RVE.…”

Section: Revisionism About Epistemic Valuementioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value

Carter

Pritchard

2015

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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A conspicuous oversight in recent debates about the vexed problem of the value of knowledge has been the value of knowledge-how. This would not be surprising if knowledge-how were, as Gilbert Ryle [1945;1949] famously thought, fundamentally different from knowledge-that. However, reductive intellectualists [e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001;Stanley 2011a;2011b; Brogaard 2008; maintain that knowledge-how just is a kind of knowledge-that. Accordingly, reductive intellectualists must predict that the value problems facing propositional knowledge will equally apply to knowledge-how. We show, however, that this is not the case. Accordingly, we highlight a value-driven argument for thinking (contra reductive intellectualism) that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.Keywords: knowledge-how; epistemic value; cognitive achievement; epistemic luck; virtue epistemology Revisionism about Epistemic ValuePropositional knowledge has long been taken (explicitly or implicitly) to be distinctively epistemically valuable-i.e., valuable in a way that would rationalise our intuitive preference for propositional knowledge in contrast with, for example, epistemic states that fall just marginally short of knowledge (e.g., Gettiered justified true belief).1 Recent work in epistemology, however,shows that it is notoriously difficult to explain how this should be so.

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“…Our claim is that two counterparts, both possessing the same degree of ability, and in the same actual circumstances, will both exhibit achievements to the same extent, even if one of the agents happens to be in an environment in which circumstances could have been unfavourable for that achievement, but in fact weren't. We take this claim to be intuitive, but for a thorough argument for this claim, see Kallestrup & Pritchard (2011). 13 This claim about knowledge is usually understood as the thesis that knowledge demands safety.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…See also Pritchard, Millar & Haddock (2010, chs. 2-4) and Kallestrup & Pritchard (2011;2012;. 12 In making this claim it is important, of course, to keep the details of the case fixed.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition, some have argued that the 'because of' relation should be treated as an undefinable primitive (e.g., Zagzebski 1999). For further discussion of these different accounts of the 'because of' relation and their relevance to particular renderings of virtue epistemology, see Kallestrup & Pritchard (2011) 6 Note that we are using cognitive ability in the way that is common among virtue epistemologists-viz., to refer to intellectual virtues, broadly construed. Cognitive ability is a term Greco (2010) has popularized in part because it is prima facie compatible with different substantive accounts of intellectual virtues.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Knowledge-how and cognitive achievement

A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How

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ABSTRACT. According to reductive intellectualism, knowledge-how just is a kind of propositional knowledge (e.g., Stanley & Williamson 2001;Stanley 2011a Stanley , 2011b Brogaard 2008Brogaard , 2009Brogaard , 2011. This proposal has proved controversial because knowledgehow and propositional knowledge do not seem to share the same epistemic properties, particularly with regard to epistemic luck. Here we aim to move the argument forward by offering a positive account of knowledge-how. In particular, we propose a new kind of anti-intellectualism. Unlike neo-Rylean anti-intellectualist views, according to which the possession of knowledge-how is just a matter of possessing certain abilities, we submit that knowledge-how is a particular kind of cognitive achievement attained just when cognitive ability is connected in the right way with successful performance.

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Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth

Cited by 75 publications

References 38 publications

Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat

Anti-luck virtue epistemology and epistemic defeat

Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value

Knowledge-how and cognitive achievement

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