Virtue Ethics and Right Action

Das, Ramon

doi:10.1080/713659702

Cited by 62 publications

(8 citation statements)

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“…The discussion is beyond the scope of this article. See, for example, Das (2003) and Johnson (2003) for criticisms, and Annas (2004) and Zyl (2009) for a defense of virtue ethical theories of right action.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Possibility of Virtue

Alzola

2012

Bus. Ethics Q.

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To have a virtue is to possess a certain kind of trait of character that is appropriate in pursuing the moral good at which the virtue aims. Human beings are assumed to be capable of attaining those traits. Yet, a number of scholars are skeptical about the very existence of such character traits. They claim a sizable amount of empirical evidence in their support. This article is concerned with the existence and explanatory power of character as a way to assess the possibility of achieving moral virtue, with particular attention paid to business context. I aim to unsettle the so-called situationist challenge to virtue ethics. In the course of this article, I shall defend four claims, namely, that virtues are more than just behavioral dispositions, that at least some virtues may not be unitary traits, that psychologists cannot infer virtues from overt behavior, and that the situationist data do not account for the observational equivalence of traits. Since it rests on a misconception of what virtue is, the situationist objection remains unconvincing.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Possibility of Virtue

Alzola

2012

Bus. Ethics Q.

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“…Must not the characteristics of decent persons in the final analysis be cashed out in terms of dispositions to perform actions that we antecedently see as having a certain moral status? In fact, although this is an objection often raised against virtue‐ethical accounts of right and wrong (recently in Das 2003), it might perhaps be thought even more serious for the specific kind of virtue‐ethical approach suggested here (since it eschews the Aristotelian understanding of the virtues as constituents of human flourishing). However, there is nothing preventing us from taking such things as the value of freedom, justice, beauty, and happiness and the disvalue of oppression, inequality, and suffering as basic values, as being prior to the virtues and the vices; and although the structure of the resulting theory will be teleological, this does not lead to consequentialism unless we think that rightness is somehow simply a function of the respective magnitudes of these values.…”

Section: Decent Persons As Setting the Standardmentioning

confidence: 90%

From Virtue to Decency

Brännmark

2006

Metaphilosophy

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In her work on virtue ethics Rosalind Hursthouse has formulated an Aristotelian criterion of rightness that understands rightness in terms of what the virtuous person would do. It is argued here that this kind of criterion does not allow enough room for the category of the supererogatory and that right and wrong should rather be understood in terms of the characteristic behavior of decent persons. Furthermore, it is suggested that this kind of approach has the added advantage of allowing one to make sense of the centrality of negative precepts in commonsense morality.

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“…But, of course, accepting this implication would render the view deeply implausible. 16 Das (2003), pp. 327 and van Zyl (2009a) pp.…”

Section: Slotean Virtue Ethicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A New Form of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics

Doviak

2010

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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In Morals From Motives, Michael Slote defends an agent-based theory of right action according to which right acts are those that express virtuous motives like benevolence or care. Critics have claimed that Slote's view-and agent-based views more generally-cannot account for several basic tenets of commonsense morality. In particular, the critics maintain that agent-based theories: (i) violate the deontic axiom that "ought" implies "can", (ii) cannot allow for a person's doing the right thing for the wrong reason, and (iii) do not yield clear verdicts in a number of cases involving "conflicting motives" and "motivational over-determination". In this paper I develop a new agent-based theory of right action designed to avoid the problems presented for Slote's view. This view makes morally right action a matter of expressing an optimal balance of virtue over vice and commands agents in each situation to improve their degree of excellence to the greatest extent possible.

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Virtue Ethics and Right Action

Cited by 62 publications

References 0 publications

The Possibility of Virtue

The Possibility of Virtue

From Virtue to Decency

A New Form of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics

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