Virtue Ethics

Annas, Julia

doi:10.1093/0195147790.003.0019

Cited by 61 publications

(48 citation statements)

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“…Rather than being grounded in just any interests that an agent might happen to have, these contexts are grounded in the social roles of that agent. The moral virtue theory of the Stoics insists that our lives and their embedded social roles are the materials with which we practice the moral virtues (Annas 2006, 522). A virtue epistemology following this same vein will make the same claim for the epistemic virtues.…”

Section: Virtue Contextualism: Methodological Contextualism Supplemenmentioning

confidence: 99%

Virtues, Social Roles, and Contextualism

Wright

2010

Metaphilosophy

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Contextualism in epistemology has been proposed both as a way to avoid skepticism and as an explanation for the variability found in our use of ''knows.'' When we turn to contextualism to perform these two functions, we should ensure that the version we endorse is well suited for these tasks. I compare two versions of epistemic contextualism: attributor contextualism (from Keith DeRose) and methodological contextualism (from Michael Williams). I argue that methodological contextualism is superior both in its response to skepticism and in its mechanism for changing contexts. However, methodological contextualism still faces two challenges: explaining why we are solidly committed to some contexts, and explaining why knowledge within a context is valuable. I propose virtue contextualism as a useful extension of methodological contextualism, focusing on the way that our virtues depend on our social roles. My proposed virtue contextualism retains the benefits of methodological contextualism while explaining both our commitment to particular contexts and the value of knowledge held within those contexts.When considering the correct way to allow context to effect our epistemic responsibilities, it is instructive to look to the example of the sensitivity of the moral and epistemic virtues to the social roles of those who possess, or are developing, the virtues. With this type of sensitivity in mind, we can then turn to examine current theories of epistemic contextualism, select the strongest of those theories, and see how it might be helpfully supplemented by a sensitivity to social roles. The resultant view, which I call virtue contextualism, combines insights of virtue theory and of epistemology. Virtues and Our Social Roles: Moral and EpistemicAny account of knowledge which leads to the conclusion that there is little or no knowledge in the world may rightly be challenged as being too demanding. Within the realm of ethics, a similar challenge is often leveled at virtue theories. Rather than setting a standard for action and asking r

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Section: Virtue Contextualism: Methodological Contextualism Supplemenmentioning

confidence: 99%

Virtues, Social Roles, and Contextualism

Wright

2010

Metaphilosophy

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“…And something very much like them seems to have animated the opposing factions in the sometimes ugly "culture war" that erupted throughout America as Schiavo neared the end of her life. 3 It seems safe to conclude that the disagreement reflected in the juxtaposition of these claims is at least consistent with the disagreement being deep.…”

Section: The Schiavo Case and Deep Disagreementmentioning

confidence: 93%

“…According to Fogelin's analysis, the fact that proponents of (1) and (2) know that they share a commitment to (3), which purports to set out a procedure for resolving certain kinds of disagreement, seems sufficient to assure them (and us) that they are still operating within the realm of normal discourse.…”

Section: Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Put another way, the mere fact that the disputants accept (3) is not sufficient to transform the context of their disagreement into normal discourse. For that to occur such shared beliefs must be capable of doing real argumentative work; it must be possible, that is, for the disputants to be brought argumentatively to resolve their disagreement over the permissibility of removing artificial nutrition by appeal to something like (3). But if that is in fact not possible, then mutual acceptance of (3) is logically compatible with the state of affairs in which supporters of(1) and of(2) deeply disagree.…”

Section: Andmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Knowing when Disagreements are Deep

Adams¹

2005

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Reasoned disagreement is a pervasive feature of public life, and the persistence of disagreement is sometimes troublesome, reflecting the need to make difficult decisions. Fogelin suggests that parties to a deep disagreement should abandon reason and switch to non-rational persuasion. But how are the parties to know when (if ever) to make such a switch? I argue that Fogelin's analysis doesn't clearly address this question, and that disputes arising in areas like medical decision making are such that the parties to them have reasons to act as if they can be rationally resolved even if they are deep. Fogelin's analysis is thus of limited value as regards the practical moral demand of addressing concrete moral dilemmas.Resume: Des desaccords sont frequents dans la vie publique et leur persistance engendre parfois des ennuis et un besoin de prendre des decisions difficiles. Fogelin suggere que les parties en desaccord devraient abandonner la raison et concentrer plutot sur la persuasion non rationnelle. Mais comment sauraient-ils quand (si jamais) changer d'approche ? J'avance que I'analyse de Fogelin n' adresse pas clairement cette question et Ie fait que les parties en desaccord dans des domaines telle que la medicine ont raison d'agir comme s'ils pouvaient rationnellement resoudre leurs desaccords, meme si ceux-ci sont profonds. L'analyse de Fogelin offre donc une aide limitee pour resoudre en pratique des dilemmes moraux concrets.

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“…John McDowell (1979), for instance, characterizes moral virtue as fundamentally involving a kind of moral perception. And Julia Annas (2005) gives the notion of practical reason a central place in her account of moral virtue. These requirements are arguably complementary and plausible.…”

Section: Moderate Autonomous Vementioning

confidence: 99%

Four Varieties of Character‐Based Virtue Epistemology

Baehr

2008

The Southern J of Philosophy

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The terrain of character‐based or “responsibilist” virtue epistemology has evolved dramatically over the last decade — so much so that it is far from clear what, if anything, unifies the various views put forth in this area. In an attempt to bring some clarity to the overall thrust and structure of this movement, I develop a fourfold classification of character‐based virtue epistemologies. I also offer a qualified assessment of each approach, defending a certain account of the probable future of this burgeoning subfield.

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Virtue Ethics

Cited by 61 publications

References 0 publications

Virtues, Social Roles, and Contextualism

Virtues, Social Roles, and Contextualism

Knowing when Disagreements are Deep

Four Varieties of Character‐Based Virtue Epistemology

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