Virtue through Challenge: Moral Development and Self-transformation

Abstract

In this article, I argue that although the Aristotelian ideal of leading a virtuous life for its own sake is admirable, conventional Aristotelian and neo‐Aristotelian accounts of how it might be realised are empirically inadequate: Habituation is unlikely to produce ‘a love of virtue’, practical experience cannot then produce practical judgement or phronesis, and Aristotle's conception of a virtuous life excludes all but an idealised elite. Instead, I argue that two conceptually distinct aspects of moral development can be identified: the ‘Aristotelian’ and the ‘Humean’. In the former, the desire to lead a virtuous life for its own sake is produced through certain forms of challenging experience which, by disturbing and decentring the egoistic self, evoke a personal moral transformation. In the latter, the capacity to act well in specific social situations is the outcome of a process of socialisation, first in upbringing and later through initiation into the practices of adult life. Both aspects should be promoted in moral education for together they produce something akin to full virtue in the Aristotelian sense: Practical wisdom and practical judgement—or phronesis. Moreover, ‘the good life’ is best conceived as encompassing a variety of transcendent goods. To live a virtuous life for its own sake constitutes one good or form of human flourishing; but it is not the only one.

The existential turn in philosophy of education: In defence of liberal autonomy

“…First, the egocentric self is not dissolved; rather, a sense of transcendence, of greater meaning and purpose, is experienced by the subject's attention being directed away from the selfish ego and its appetitive, acquisitive instincts. Second, the engagements that would evoke this sense of self‐transcendence—of meaning, purpose, belonging and fulfilment—are wide ranging and include personal relationships and commitments, service to others, intellectual and artistic endeavours, encounters with nature, spiritual experience and projects and personal challenges of all kinds (see Miller, 2017, p. 793). Third, there is no ‘authentic self’ waiting to be revealed consequent on worldly interests and attachments being eliminated; rather, it is precisely through forming contingent personal attachments and relationships with the world and with others that most of us gain, wholly or in part, a sense of self‐transcendence, meaning and purpose in our lives.…”

‘Ethics is an Optics’: Ethical Practicality and the Exposure of Teaching

“…Miller finds an answer elsewhere. This is not explicit in the paper in question, but it does become clearer in his other works: he finds an answer in character education (Miller, , ).…”

“…With its attempts to inculcate students into practices and traditions, and with its professed contribution to academic achievement, character education feeds into traditional ways of teaching and the status quo—perhaps inevitably so, given that the very idea of character education draws on models of virtuous behaviour grounded in fairly traditional notions of discipline. What Miller advocates is a particular form of character education that involves ‘adventure education’ or ‘service learning’ (Miller, ). He emphasises the potential benefits of the challenges encountered in these.…”

Levinas, Ethics and the People: A reply to Soyoung Lee and Paul Standish

“…On a personal note, I find it odd that the field of character education, which I have defended elsewhere (Miller, , ), evokes such dismissive reactions from my critics. Teachers and instructors who have been involved in adventure education, team‐building activities and service learning (which have long ceased to be the preserve of private schools), who see at first hand the positive effects of these experiences in developing confidence, self‐esteem and ‘social skills’ in young people who are sometimes chronically lacking in them, would be surprised to hear that their efforts are so peripheral; that ‘the ethical dimension in teaching’ resides not in group endeavours, or in shared experiences, or through fostering mutual aid, but in such things as ‘lessons that allow for open possibilities’, ‘thinking open to infinity’ and ‘living with disturbance’ (Lee, , p. 159) — insights which a select group of philosophers are granted through their study of Levinas.…”