Visible and Invisible Differences: The Somali Paradox

Abstract

In exploring the difficulties experienced by the traditionally politically uncentralised Somalis in establishing a stable and effective state, based on their ethnicity, this article compares ethnicity, nationalism and lineage identity. In this case, ethnicity and nationalism are local products, influenced but not created by the colonial experience. They have had to contend with the intractable force of segmentary lineage identity, which has proved extremely difficult to adapt and accommodate to the requirements of modern statehood. In its cultural context, agnation is all the more pervasive and powerful in constituting an ‘invisible’ bond, conceived by Somalis as a biologically based distinction like ‘race’. Unlike race, it is almost infinitely elastic and divisible. Ethnic identity, which rests on external distinctions such as language, culture and religion, cannot be broken down into a series of formally equivalent segments, but is less binding as a social force. Today, after the collapse of the state of Somalia in 1991, following protracted grass‐roots peace‐making between clans, two parts of the nation—the former British Somaliland, and the north‐eastern region of Somalia (‘Puntland’, based on the Majerteyn clan, and other closely related clans)—have developed separate local states. Although Somaliland claims complete independence, which Puntland does not, both polities incorporate parliamentary institutions that accommodate traditional, and modern political leaders and processes. The ex‐Italian residue, Southern Somalia, still without any form of government, is in what appears to be the final throes of its long‐running, fourteenth grandiose international ‘peace’ conference in Kenya. Thousands of delegates, in various configurations, have already spent over eighteen months in these talks. Although its embryonic constitution now recognises ‘clans’ as constituent political units, this attempt to re‐establish Somalia is based on the usual ‘top‐down’ approach, rather than on spontaneous local negotiations amongst ‘stakeholders’ on the ground, such as those on which Somaliland and Puntland are founded. With contingents of foreign ‘experts’, the whole process seeks to reinstate a familiar Eurocentric state model, unadapted to Somali conditions.

Trust, Cultural Health Capital, and Immigrants’ Health Care Integration in Norway

“…Considering that the first Somalis to seek asylum in Norway arrived in the late 1980s, combined with the fact that the authorities did not discriminate based on clan (Assal, 2006), the Norway-Somali population is highly heterogeneous in terms of both age, duration of residency, clan composition, war, migration, and resettlement experiences, as well as levels of education and integration. To account for this complexity, the aim was to recruit a diverse set of interviewees, particularly in terms of gender and affinity to the main clans of Dir, Isaq, Hawiye, Darod, Digil, and Rahanweyn, as this defines Somali notions of identity and collaboration (Lewis, 2002(Lewis, , 2004.…”

“…Whereas ethnic Norwegians rely heavily on institutions beyond the family for help and security, Somalis, who have a limited tradition of trusting in state institutions (Lewis, 2004(Lewis, , 2002, often rely upon the traditional system of patrilineal clanship for structuring social networks and for maintaining a sense of ontological security and identity in diaspora (McGown, 1999;Farah, 2000;Hopkins, 2006;Engebrigtsen, 2007). Against this backdrop, health care trust/mistrust is not simply the direct outcome of individuals' health care encounters but is also generated or counter-worked in immigrants' interaction and exchange with each other.…”

Kinship, nomadism, and humanitarian aid among Somalis in Ethiopia

“…Don't say the man was closer in blood relation to me, but say that he was good to mepeople will not forget that. 2 Loyalty to 'clan' (qabiil) and family (reer) is often cited as characteristic of Somalis and central to their personal and social identities (Lewis, 1999(Lewis, , 2004Abbink, 2003;Hagmann, 2005). Kinship and 'clan' in the Somali Region undeniably shape local targeting and distribution of international aid (Sabates-Wheeler, Lind, and Hoddinott, 2013)and access by pastoralists and semi-pastoralists to natural resources (Watkins and Fleisher, 2002).…”

“…a unity that borders on xenophobia'. In other publications, Lewis (1961Lewis ( , 1999Lewis ( , 2004 situates political relations within the segmented lineage system. 'Clanship' itself, he argues, begets political strife and continual struggles for natural and economic resources.…”

What Does the Somali Experience Teach Us about the Social Contract and the State?

“…Thus the authority of southern clan elders has been eroded by their being co-opted into partisan 9. Corroborated by multiple field observations throughout Africa by the authors since 1963. political combat (Bakonyi and Stuvoy, 2005;Gundel and Dharbaxo, 2006;Lewis, 2004;LeSage, 2001;Little, 2003;Samatar, 1992;also, Interviews, 2006: 45, 78). Many believe that the clans were manipulated and bought in the creation of the TFG, compromising its legitimacy.…”