Voluntary disclosure and the strategic behavior of colleges

Conlin, Michael; Dickert‐Conlin, Stacy; Chapman, Gabrielle

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2013.09.007

Cited by 14 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Business schools provide a rich empirical context in which to test for patterns of voluntary disclosure of quality reports for several reasons. First, rankings have been shown to have a large effect on applicants' decisions (Bowman and Bastedo 2009, Meredith 2004, Monks and Ehrenberg 1999 and admissions decisions (Conlin et al 2013). Hence, business schools have the incentive to be strategic in their disclosure decisions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic disclosure: The case of business school rankings

Luca

Smith

2015

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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We empirically analyze disclosure decisions made by 240 MBA programs about which rankings to display on their websites. We present three main findings. First, consistent with theories of countersignaling, top schools are least likely to disclose their rankings, whereas mid-ranked schools are most likely to disclose. Second, schools that do poorly in the U.S. News rankings are more likely to disclose their Princeton Review certification, suggesting that schools treat different certifications as substitutes. Third, conditional on displaying a ranking, the majority of schools coarsen information to make it seem more favorable. The stark patterns in the data help to provide empirical evidence on the strategic elements of voluntary disclosure and marketing decisions.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic disclosure: The case of business school rankings

Luca

Smith

2015

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…Sellers in online auctions can selectively disclose shipping charges (Brown et al, 2007). Colleges can incentivize good (or bad) students to disclose (or not disclose) their SAT scores to US News and World Report (Conlin et al, 2008). In politics and law, the analogous situation is when one can choose to disclose the answer a direct question, or can avoid answering the question (e.g.,"pleading the fifth" in legal settings).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

To Review or Not to Review? Limited Strategic Thinking at the Movie Box Office

Brown

Camerer

Lovallo

2012

American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

103

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Film studios occasionally withhold movies from critics before their release. These cold openings provide a natural setting to apply laboratory-developed models of limited strategic thinking to the field. In a set of 1,303 widely released movies, cold opening is correlated with a 10–30 percent increase in domestic box-office revenue, and a pattern of fan disappointment, consistent with the hypothesis that some moviegoers do not infer low quality from cold opening. While selection and endogeneity may play a role in these regressions, the full pattern of results is consistent with level-k and cognitive hierarchy behavioral-game-theoretic models. (JEL D12, D82, L82, M37)

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“…The hidden information can be costly for buyers and mortgage companies. In terms of university rankings, Morse and Flanigan (2013) and Conlin et al (2013) report that some universities may intentionally choose not to disclose certain student information in order to increase their rankings. Lipsett (2008) points out that some universities hide poor research information related to university rankings.…”

Section: Experimental Evaluationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Predictive Analytics with Strategically Missing Data

Zhang

2020

INFORMS Journal on Computing

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We study strategically missing data problems in predictive analytics with regression. In many real-world situations, such as financial reporting, college admission, job application, and marketing advertisement, data providers often conceal certain information on purpose in order to gain a favorable outcome. It is important for the decision-maker to have a mechanism to deal with such strategic behaviors. We propose a novel approach to handle strategically missing data in regression prediction. The proposed method derives imputation values of strategically missing data based on the Support Vector Regression models. It provides incentives for the data providers to disclose their true information. We show that with the proposed method imputation errors for the missing values are minimized under some reasonable conditions. An experimental study on real-world data demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed approach.

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Voluntary disclosure and the strategic behavior of colleges

Cited by 14 publications

References 21 publications

Strategic disclosure: The case of business school rankings

Strategic disclosure: The case of business school rankings

To Review or Not to Review? Limited Strategic Thinking at the Movie Box Office

Predictive Analytics with Strategically Missing Data

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