2020
DOI: 10.1186/s11782-020-00075-5
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Voluntary disclosures and peer-to-peer lending decisions: Evidence from the repeated game

Abstract: This study investigates the effect of voluntary disclosures on lending decisions in the repeated game. Using a unique dataset from a peer-to-peer lending platform, "ppdai" (paipaidai), we document that voluntary disclosures in the repeated game play a stronger role in promoting funding success than those in the one-shot game. We argue that voluntary disclosures improve the bidding activity in the repeated game through which they increase funding success. In addition, the greater impact of voluntary disclosures… Show more

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Cited by 4 publications
(2 citation statements)
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References 64 publications
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“…Stocken (2000) analyzes the credibility of a manager's disclosure of privately observed non-verifiable information in a repeated cheap-talk game setting and indicates that managers do not make any informative disclosures (or, communication does not occur) in the single-period game, whereas in the repeated game, the manager almost always truthfully reveals his private information. The empirical evidence by Li et al (2020) supports the arguments of Stocken (2000) that voluntary disclosures have higher credibility in the repeated game than in the one-stage game. From another perspective, D'Augusta and DeAngelis (2017) notes that accounting information is able to prevent "cheap talk" in qualitative disclosure by providing a benchmark to evaluate the truthfulness of managers' statements.…”
Section: Literature Reviewsupporting
confidence: 66%
“…Stocken (2000) analyzes the credibility of a manager's disclosure of privately observed non-verifiable information in a repeated cheap-talk game setting and indicates that managers do not make any informative disclosures (or, communication does not occur) in the single-period game, whereas in the repeated game, the manager almost always truthfully reveals his private information. The empirical evidence by Li et al (2020) supports the arguments of Stocken (2000) that voluntary disclosures have higher credibility in the repeated game than in the one-stage game. From another perspective, D'Augusta and DeAngelis (2017) notes that accounting information is able to prevent "cheap talk" in qualitative disclosure by providing a benchmark to evaluate the truthfulness of managers' statements.…”
Section: Literature Reviewsupporting
confidence: 66%
“…The potential risks related to digital financial inclusion could extend across financial inclusion itself and affect the soundness, safety, and long-term well-being of the overall financial system. Recently, China has implemented a series of policies and guidelines to cope with the increasing risk of peer-topeer lending and cash lending, which improves the legal and regulatory framework (Li et al 2020).…”
Section: The Potential Risk Of Digital Inclusive Financementioning
confidence: 99%