Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for Environmental Protection?

Segerson, Kathleen; Miceli, Thomas J.

doi:10.1006/jeem.1998.1040

Cited by 397 publications

(240 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Cf. Segerson-Miceli, 1998). 5 In our analysis we consider the possibility that only a subgroup of firms belonging to the industry decides to sign the VA.…”

Section: Regulatory-cost Minimising Vas With Intra-industry Spilloversmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…His objective is the maximisation of social welfare. The regulator we are considering is fairly similar to that of Segerson and Miceli (1998), Glachant (2007) or Lyon and Maxwell (2003), i.e. a public authority which has incomplete control of a mandatory threat of taxation or command and control intervention, but which, by promoting the use of a VA, is able to eliminate or reduce the severity of such mandatory threat and provide firms with technical or financial incentives.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…literature (e.g., for public voluntary programs, see Wu and Babcock, 1999;Lyon and Maxwell, 2003;Glachant, 2007; for negotiated agreements, Segerson and Miceli, 1998;Manzini and Mariotti, 2003;for unilateral commitments, Bagnoli and Watts, 2003;Lutz, Lyon and Maxwell, 2000).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The design of voluntary agreements in oligopolistic markets

Brau

Carraro

2010

J Regul Econ

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This paper analyses the conditions under which a group of firms have the incentive to sign a voluntary agreement (VA) to control polluting emissions even in the presence of free-riding by other firms in the industry. We consider a policy framework in which firms in a given industry decide whether or not to sign a VA proposed by an environmental regulator. We identify the features that a VA should possess in order to provide firms with an incentive to participate in the VA and to enhance its economic and environmental effectiveness. Under very general conditions on the shape of the demand schedule, we obtain the following results. First, a VA does not belong to the equilibrium of the coalition game when benefits from voluntary emission abatement are a pure public good, unless an industry emission target is set by the regulator. Second, in the presence of partial spillovers-i.e. when signatories obtain more benefits from the VA than non-signatories-a VA can belong to the equilibrium only if a minimum participation rule is guaranteed. Third, a VA with a minimum participation rule and a minimum mandatory emission abatement may improve welfare (and even industry profits) compared to a VA in which firms are free to set their own profit maximizing abatement level

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“…Cf. Segerson-Miceli, 1998). 5 In our analysis we consider the possibility that only a subgroup of firms belonging to the industry decides to sign the VA.…”

Section: Regulatory-cost Minimising Vas With Intra-industry Spilloversmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The design of voluntary agreements in oligopolistic markets

Brau

Carraro

2010

J Regul Econ

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“…Non-mandatory information disclosure strategies are feasible and cost-effective instruments for regulating emissions (Khanna, 2001;Maxwell, Lyon, & Hackett, 2000;Segerson & Miceli, 1998). Pollution abatement is a public good, and in the absence of credible sanctions, firms have little to no incentives to cut down emissions (Jorgensen & Syme, 2000;Smulders & Gradus, 1996).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public disclosure for carbon abatement: African decision-makers in a PROPER public good experiment

Akpalu

Abidoye

Muchapondwa

et al. 2016

Climate and Development

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A linear public good experiment adopted from Holt and Laury [1997. Classroom games: Voluntary provision of a public good. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(4), 209-215.] has been employed to investigate strategic behaviour in pollution abatement among African climate decision-makers. The experiment consisted of three groups, of which groups 2 and 3 received one and two treatments, respectively. The first treatment entailed publicly disclosing the pollution of each member of a group by placing a corresponding colour-coded card in front of each subject, while the second involved the withdrawal of the public disclosure. Group 2 received the first treatment; Group 3 received both the first and second treatments in succession. We found that the untreated group (baseline) polluted more than the two treated groups, and there was no statistically significant difference between the pollution abatement of the two treated groups. These results suggest that public disclosure potentially drives pollution abatement and that its eventual withdrawal does not obliterate abatement behaviour. We did not observe conditional cooperation but average pollution declined over time. Furthermore, individuals who thought it was unfair for Africa to reduce emissions polluted more. We also found that pollution levels differ significantly between males and females.

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“…Theoretical analyses of voluntary program can be found in Lyon and Maxwell (2003) and Segerson and Miceli (1998). 1 Evaluations of numerous voluntary programs throughout the world can be found in Morgenstern and Pizer (2007), with most finding only a small, if any, effect on environmental outcomes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluating Voluntary Measures with Treatment Spillovers: The Case of Coal Combustion Products Partnership

Lange¹

2009

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis &Amp; Policy

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Voluntary measures are an increasing part of the environmental policy portfolio in most of the world. The economics literature on voluntary measures has found mixed evidence of their effect on environmental outcomes, controlling for the behavior of those who are not affiliated with the measure (non-partners) and trends leading up to the policy initiation. Traditionally, a voluntary measure would be labeled a success if the measure's partners statistically improved their environmental outcome compared to non-partners, once the measure was initiated. However, that type of evaluation assumes that voluntary measures provide the treatment exclusively to partners. In practice, for many reasons, the treatment provided to partners may also spillover to affect the behavior of non-partners. In voluntary programs, information on the reuse of an input can spread from partner firms to non-partner firms. If the researcher does not account for these treatment spillovers in the evaluation, it is possible for successful measures to be found unsuccessful.It is argued below that an alternative interpretation of a successful voluntary measure is needed, especially for those that involve treatment spillovers. Conditions under which a voluntary measure with treatment spillovers would be considered successful are discussed and then tested using the Coal Combustion Products Partnership (C2P2). The purpose of this voluntary program in the U.S. is to increase the reuse, as opposed to disposal, of coal combustion products (CCP). A difference-in-difference estimator finds that C2P2 partners are not statistically different from non-partners in their reuse rates, though the total reuse of coal combustion products has statistically increased over time. Further, non-partners located in states with more C2P2 partners statistically increase their reuse rate more than those in states with few C2P2 partners. The evidence is consistent with conditions needed for a program to be successful in reducing overall the disposal of CCP by partners and non-partners.

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Voluntary Environmental Agreements: Good or Bad News for Environmental Protection?

Cited by 397 publications

References 16 publications

The design of voluntary agreements in oligopolistic markets

The design of voluntary agreements in oligopolistic markets

Public disclosure for carbon abatement: African decision-makers in a PROPER public good experiment

Evaluating Voluntary Measures with Treatment Spillovers: The Case of Coal Combustion Products Partnership

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