Vote Switching in the U.S. House

Espino, Rodolfo; Canon, David T.

doi:10.1017/s002238160809021x

Cited by 7 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…It has been written that members of Congress "die in their ideological boots" (Poole, 2007, p. 435). Though clearly an oversimplification (see Espino & Canon 2009), the general stability of lawmakers' preferences is important for policy repeal. When supporters of the policy at enactment remain in Congress, they can be expected to safeguard their policies against attempts to undo the original agreement.…”

Section: Legislative Coalitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Lifecycle of Public Policy: An Event History Analysis of Repeals to Landmark Legislative Enactments, 1951-2006

Ragusa

2010

American Politics Research

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The first stage in the policy lifecycle-creation-has garnered significant attention while the final stage-repeal-has received scarcely any. To reconcile this imbalance, an extensive data set recording repeals to landmark laws enacted from 1951 to 2006 was complied. Event history analysis yields three significant results. First, the incidence of repeal exhibits a regular pattern characterized by an increasing hazard immediately after enactment followed by institutionalization and a monotonically declining hazard. Second, divided government has a complementary effect on the policy process, simultaneously constraining lawmakers from reversing enacted policies while effecting more durable legislation over the long term. Thus, the negative effects of divided government on policy production are offset by a decrease in policy repeal. Third, polarization has a curvilinear effect on the risk of repeal. Moderate polarization facilitates coalition formation when enacting repeals while polarized and depolarized periods have an attenuating effect.

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Section: Legislative Coalitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Lifecycle of Public Policy: An Event History Analysis of Repeals to Landmark Legislative Enactments, 1951-2006

Ragusa

2010

American Politics Research

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“…There is a tension, though, between the theory of representation and the empirical literature of congres sional voting. Although members are assumed to adapt to the changes of the median voter, congressional voting behavior portrays legislators as stable ideologues (Poole, 2007; but see Espino & Canon, 2009). Rarely changing their ideological positions, studies have shown that representatives are gener ally resistant to alter their voting behavior in correspondence with shifts of the median voter (Grofman, Griffin, & Berry, 1995;Lott, 1987).…”

Section: Policy Congruence Legislative Shirking and Direct Democracymentioning

confidence: 99%

Shirking the Initiative? The Effects of Statewide Ballot Measures on Congressional Roll Call Behavior

Huder

Ragusa

Smith

2010

American Politics Research

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Do ballot measures affect congressional voting behavior? Examining the issues of gay marriage, campaign finance, and minimum wage, we test if the results of statewide ballot initiatives inform congressional roll call votes on legislation occupying the same issue space. Theoretically, we expect signals from ballot measures-which provide precise information about the preferences of a member's voting constituency-reduce policy "shirking" by members. Our findings across the three issues indicate that ballot initiative outcomes alter the floor votes of members of the House, reducing legislative shirking, but we find that the educative effect of ballot measures is attenuated in the Senate due to institutional factors. We attribute the positive effect in House to the precise signal ballot measures provide members about the preferences of the median voter in their district.

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“…The arguments about information, ideology, and organization have been construed as general claims whose validity may be sustained irrespective of regime types. The informational argument claims that legislators may switch their votes prompted by new information about bills that may emerge in the course of the lawmaking process (Espino and Canon 2009; Harden and Kirkland 2018; Hamm 1982; Krehbiel 1995; Odom, Norris, and Meyer 2018). Debates among bill sponsors and critics in committee may induce them to vote one way, but either subsequent discussion of the bill—that is, with interest groups or constituents—or amendments on the floor may generate new information that cause them to update their beliefs, alter their preferences, and vote differently in floor roll calls 3 .…”

Section: Explaining Vote Switchingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The ideological argument claims that ideologically extreme legislators are less likely to switch their vote than ideological moderates because the former stand more to lose with their parties and constituents than the latter (Espino and Canon 2009; Harden and Kirkland 2018; Krehbiel 1995; Seo 2010). While switching by moderates may be perceived as accommodation of contrasting viewpoints, and thus help their reelection chances by propping up their reputation as centrists, switching by extremists would more likely be perceived as betrayal, and thus hurt their reelection prospects by construing them as flip‐floppers.…”

Section: Explaining Vote Switchingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vote Switching in Multiparty Presidential Systems: Evidence from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies

Bonvecchi

Clerici

2021

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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Why do legislators switch their votes between the committee and floor stages in multiparty presidential systems? the literature on the us Congress has argued that switches are conditional on cross-cutting pressures by competing principals (i.e., party leaders and interest groups), partisanship, electoral competitiveness, ideology, seniority, and informational updates. this article argues that unlike in the us two-party system, in multiparty systems electoral competitiveness increases the likelihood of switching. additionally, the practice of switching is more likely for legislators whose competing principals are leaders with conflicting electoral interests. We test these hypotheses analyzing vote switches between committee reports and roll-call votes in the argentine Chamber of deputies. Our results indicate that legislative vote switching indeed behaves differently in multiparty than in a two-party presidential system.

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Vote Switching in the U.S. House

Cited by 7 publications

References 12 publications

The Lifecycle of Public Policy: An Event History Analysis of Repeals to Landmark Legislative Enactments, 1951-2006

The Lifecycle of Public Policy: An Event History Analysis of Repeals to Landmark Legislative Enactments, 1951-2006

Shirking the Initiative? The Effects of Statewide Ballot Measures on Congressional Roll Call Behavior

Vote Switching in Multiparty Presidential Systems: Evidence from the Argentine Chamber of Deputies

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