Vote Switching on Foreign Policy in the U.S. House of Representatives

Abstract

How do party members manage recurring and divisive foreign policy agendas? Do they stay the course or switch their position? The annual decision in Congress regarding the extension of China’s most favored nation (MFN) status was a high-profile foreign policy battle between the anti-China coalition and its pro-China counterpart. To test theories of members’ vote choice and change, this article analyzes the U.S. House of Representatives roll call votes over China trade policy from 1990 through 2000. Despite the conventional wisdom of voting stability over a recurring agenda, some members engaged in a substantial amount of vote switching. Changes in voting context such as party status, constituency interests, campaign finance, and seniority contributed to members’ position shifts. The findings of this study suggest that cross-cutting domestic interests over foreign policy debates in the post—Cold War era lead party members to recalculate the benefits of vote stability and the costs of vote switching.

The Repercussions of Realignment: United States-China Interdependence and Exchange Rate Politics

“…Given the vast interconnectedness between the two economies, the possibility of Chinese government economic retaliation looms in the background of any policy decision . A US protectionist policy might very well be responded to in kind; this possibility serves as a key consideration for economic interest groups and legislators (Bown :39; Seo :1082–92; Xie :738; Zeng :20–21) . The potential for retaliation is made even more likely given the linkages between the exchange rate and other international economic policy areas.…”

“…In the last decade, US‐to‐China trade has grown fivefold, a pace far faster than the US global export growth average (US‐China Business Council :2,5). Continued access to the Chinese market is an especially important concern for agricultural industries, including producers of wheat, livestock, and dairy goods, as well as certain high‐end technology sectors, such as aerospace product manufacturers (Seo :1078–92; Xie :738). In fact, in these sectors, the United States often enjoys a trade surplus with China.…”

“…The same is true for sectors that rely on imported intermediate goods, such as the construction industry. Financial interests are likely to oppose a bilateral economic conflict for a host of reasons (Seo :1082–83). Exports and capital flows from China ultimately facilitate consumption and cheap borrowing in the United States; additionally, the banking sector would benefit from stable relations that lead to financial sector liberalization in China.…”

“…In some cases, the link between policy areas is explicit. Recent currency legislation, for instance, contemplates imposing punitive tariffs on countries deemed to be “currency manipulators.” Such policy measures could entail severe implications for a variety of US‐based economic interests (Bown :39; Seo :1082–92; Xie :738; Zeng :20–21). First, many firms stand to face substantial costs from additional tariffs on Chinese goods.…”

“…China's rapid growth altered the structure of the international system, leading to a realignment of many countries' foreign policies (Flores‐Macías and Kreps ). With respect to US foreign policy, research increasingly considers how the codependent relationship between the United States and China shapes policymaking (Bown ; Drezner ; McNally ; Seo :1088–94; Xie :738; Zeng ). Despite extensive “China bashing” in current American political rhetoric (Ramirez ), the findings here strongly suggest that elected officials recognize the potential consequences associated with disrupting the United States–China economic relationship.…”