Voting Against Your Constituents? How Lobbying Affects Representation

Abstract

Citizens delegate the representation of their political preferences to members of Parliament (MPs), who are supposed to represent their interests in the legislature. However, MPs are exposed to a variety of interest groups seeking to influence their voting behavior. We argue that interest groups influence how MPs cast their vote in Parliament, but that this effect varies across groups. While lobbying by sectional groups provides incentives for MPs to defect from their constituents, we expect that cause groups in fact strengthen the link between MPs and their voters. We test our argument based on an innovative study of 118 Swiss public referenda, which allows for directly comparing voter preferences with legislative voting of 448 MPs on these issues. Drawing on a multilevel regression analysis, this study shows that interest groups considerably affect the link between MPs and their voters. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of political representation.

No place like home: Opinion formation with homophily and implications for policy decisions

“…Ågren et al (2006), Grofman (2004), Matsusaka (2010), Padovano (2013), Portmann et al (2012), Giger and Klüver (2015), provide an overview of related literature in economics as well as in political science.…”

Testing the Median Voter Model and Moving Beyond its Limits: Do Personal Characteristics Explain Legislative Shirking?

“…We include an indicator for MPs with children, as children have been shown to affect the policy choices of their parents (see, e.g., Washington, ). Finally, we include the number of interest group affiliations and the squared number of affiliations (see Giger and Klüver, ). Analyzing these characteristics, we observe that none of them exerts a statistically significant influence on the legislative shirking of majority‐elected MPs.…”

The survival of interest groups: evidence from Germany

“…Interest group scholars distinguish between different types of interest groups that vary in their collective action potential (e.g. D€ ur and De Bi evre 2007; Giger and Kl€ uver 2016;Kl€ uver 2012;Offe 1969;Olson 1965). Researchers employ varying definitions to capture differences in interest group type such as public vs. private interest groups or specific vs. diffuse interest groups.…”