Voting on California's Tax and Expenditure Limitation Initiative

Levy, Mickey D.

doi:10.1086/ntj41863138

Cited by 17 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…A high and increasing total tax burden suggests an increased tax price, thereby increasing support for TELs. However, taxes and expenditures are necessarily linked, and high and increasing taxes may instead reflect an expressed desire for high and increasing public services; the demand for public services may also stem from altruistic motivations, not simply self-interested ones (Levy 1975). In either such setting, TEL passage actually becomes less likely with a greater observed burden of taxation.…”

Section: The Median Voter In An Imperfect and Changing Worldmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some other work has examined whether TELs have had a positive or negative impact on the operation of governments (Ladd 1978;Brennan and Buchanan 1980). Of most relevance to this article, there are numerous studies that have investigated why voters support tax limitations, using survey data on individual attitudes toward government in a particular state in a particular year (Levy 1975;Mariotti 1978;Courant, Gramlich, and Rubinfeld 1980;Gramlich, Rubinfeld, and Swift 1981;Ladd andWilson 1982, 1983;Gramlich and Rubinfeld 1982;Stein, Hamm, and Freeman 1983). 2 However, little research has examined for all states over an extended period of time the actual statewide conditions that affect TEL passage.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In fact, there is some empirical evidence that higher-income families are more likely to support a tax limitation. See Levy (1975), Mariotti (1978), and Ladd and Wilson (1982).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Why do Tax and Expenditure Limitations Pass in State Elections?

Alm

Skidmore

1999

Public Finance Review

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This article uses information on the actual conditions in all states over the extended period 1978 to 1990 to estimate the probability of tax and expenditure limitation (TEL) passage in state elections. This probability is a function of economic, fiscal, demographic, and political factors in the state, as well as specific features of the TEL; these variables are chosen to measure demand-side and supply-side features of the political process in the state. The estimation procedures use maximum likelihood techniques; a special feature of the estimation is correction for the sample selection bias that may occur with standard probit estimation because a threshold set of conditions must exist before any limitation is even placed on a statewide ballot and a voting outcome is actually observed. The results show that increases in both property taxation and local revenues relative to state revenues increase the probability of TEL passage; however, increases in total state tax revenues are associated with a lower likelihood of TEL passage. Furthermore, changes in income and in the tax price of state and local public services are important determinants of TEL passage over time. Specific features of a limitation do not generally affect passage probabilities, although a state that has already imposed a limitation is less likely to do so again. Political and demographic features of the state also have little impact on TEL outcomes.

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Section: The Median Voter In An Imperfect and Changing Worldmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Why do Tax and Expenditure Limitations Pass in State Elections?

Alm

Skidmore

1999

Public Finance Review

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Intergovernmental grants and successful tax limitation referenda

Leyden

1988

Public Choice

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Analyses of fiscal limitation referenda have typically ignored the role of institutional structure in referenda outcomes. This article demonstrates the importance of such structure through the investigation of intergovernmental grants in a model of federal tax rate determination. Tax limitation referenda are shown to depend upon both the use of tax rates as a grant disbursement criterion as well as the size of the proposed tax cut.

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