Voting over selective immigration policies with immigration aversion

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThe claim that "skilled immigration is welcome" is often associated to the increasing adoption of selective immigration policies. I study the voting over differentiated immigration policies in a two-country, three-factor one-period model where there exist skilled and unskilled workers, migration decisions are endogenous, enforcing immigration restriction is costly, and natives dislike unskilled immigration. According to my findings, decisions over border closure are made to protect the median voter when her capital endowment is sufficiently small. Therefore I argue that the professed favour for skilled immigration veils the protection for the insiders. This result is confirmed by the observation that entry is rationed for both skilled and unskilled workers. Moreover, immigration aversion helps to explain the existence of entry barriers for unskilled workers in countries where the majority of voters is skilled.

Fiscal Revenues and Commitment in Immigration Amnesties

“…Thus, with respect to the first best, in the time-consistent equilibrium the amnesty is unable to make all illegal workers come forward, and fiscal revenues are reduced. Somewhat paradoxically, the lack of commitment harms the poorest immigrants, who would gain most from legalization 17 and have the lowestp i s.…”

Immigration and Demographics: Can High Immigrant Fertility Explain Voter Support for Immigration?

“…1 Related literature on political-economic equilibrium models of immigration includes Benhabib (1996) that studies endogenous political-economic equilibrium immigration policy when agents are heterogeneous; Ortega (2005Ortega ( , 2010, who studies the Markov political-economic equilibrium of endogenous immigration policies with skill-upgrading in the presence of differentiated labor. Russo (2011) studies endogenous immigration policy with skilled and unskilled labor in a model where agents display immigration aversion of unskilled labor. Dolmas and Huffman (2004) study the joint political decision of immigration and redistribution policy, whereas Sand and Razin (2007) study the Markov equilibria of immigration and a pay-as-you-go social security system.…”

Who contributes? A strategic approach to a European immigration policy

“…Facchini and Willmann (2005) adopt a common agency approach. Mazza and Van Winden (1996), Amegashie (2004), Epstein and Nitzan (2006), Russo (2011), determine immigration quotas from voting, lobbying and/or bargaining models.…”