Voting Over Type and Generosity of a Pension System when Some Individuals are Myopic

Designing a linear pension scheme with forced savings and wage heterogeneity

“…This paper is normative; a paternalistic social planner designs an optimal pension system, optimal from an ex post standpoint for the myopic individuals. In Cremer et al (2006b), we have also analyzed the political economy aspect of the same problem wherein individuals, myopic and rational, vote ex ante for a pension system. We there assume that the myopic, when they vote, are in a kind of "state of grace", which makes them choose a commitment device.…”

“…Like Feldstein, we consider a society in which two types of individuals coexist: rational ones who do not have to be forced to save and 1 In a companion paper, we look at this issue of political sustainability. See Cremer et al (2006b). 2 There is another rationale for public pension that is not considered here and that appears when there is some sort of welfare or minimum pension.…”

The dynamics of inequality and social security in general equilibrium

“…12 In the 12 See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a more detailed discussion of probabilistic voting.…”

Redistributive Politics and Government Debt in a Borrowing‐constrained Economy

“…Several theories have been provided to make sense of the above-mentioned puzzles. Examples include political bias towards the rich (Benabou, 2000), the prospect of upward mobility by lowincome agents (Quadrini, 1999;Benabou and Ok, 2001;Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005;Arawatari and Ono, 2009), lobbying and campaign contributions by the rich (Rodriguez, 2004;Campante, 2010), voters' preferences for redistribution (Creedy and Moslehi, 2009;Creedy et al, 2010), and borrowing constraints that hit low-income agents (Casamatta et al, 2000;Bellettini and Berti Ceroni, 2007;Cremer et al, 2007). These studies, however, assume that redistributive expenditure is financed only via income tax.…”