2015
DOI: 10.1016/j.ress.2015.05.013
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Vulnerability analysis of complementary transportation systems with applications to railway and airline systems in China

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Cited by 76 publications
(37 citation statements)
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“…In addition, infrastructure systems are usually characterized by different performance metrics, even for the same type of infrastructure system . This article takes the Chinese railway system as an example for illustrative purposes, and this section will briefly introduce a performance metric and two performance models for railway systems, which have been studied in the authors’ previous work …”
Section: Spatially Localized Failures and Their Induced Vulnerabilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In addition, infrastructure systems are usually characterized by different performance metrics, even for the same type of infrastructure system . This article takes the Chinese railway system as an example for illustrative purposes, and this section will briefly introduce a performance metric and two performance models for railway systems, which have been studied in the authors’ previous work …”
Section: Spatially Localized Failures and Their Induced Vulnerabilitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The second type is infrastructure vulnerability analysis under intentional attacks. These attacks usually cause the failures of important components that are determined according to component degree, betweenness, load levels, or are identified by using optimization techniques to search a set of components whose failures can cause the largest system‐level vulnerability . In addition to these studies on intentional attacks, which still do not consider component geographical locations, there also exist some other types of intentional attack, such as bomb or explosive assault, which only cause the failures of infrastructure components within a localized area.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Teoria grafów bardzo często wykorzystywana jest do analizy różnego rodzaju sieci, głównie społecznych 5 , ale również sieci neuronowych 6 , sieci biologicznych 7 oraz sieci komputero- 7 Rual J.-F., Venkatesan K., Hao T., Hirozane-Kishikawa T., Dricot A., Li N., Berriz G.F., Gibbons F.D., Dreze M., Ayivi-Guedehoussou N., Klitgord N., Simon C., Boxem M., Milstein S., Rosenberg J., Goldberg D.S., Zhang L.V., Wong S.L., Franklin G., Li S., Albala J.S., Lim J., Fraughton C., Llamosas E., Cevik S., Bex C., Lamesch P., Sikorski R.S., Vandenhaute J., Zoghbi H.Y., Smolyar A., Bosak S., Sequerra R., Doucette-Stamm L. ta, połączona z analizą przestrzenną sieci, umożliwia również wyciągnięcie wstępnych wniosków o odporności sieci na zakłócenia lub zagrożenia. Uzyskane z analizy informacje o typie sieci czy też o roli poszczególnych węzłów w sieci pozwalają wstępnie oszacować, które z punktów są szczególnie wrażliwe na potencjalne zagrożenia lub ataki 11 .…”
Section: Metodologia Przeprowadzonych Badańunclassified
“…In the literature, scholars have studied CIS vulnerability under different types of disruptive events, including (1) random failures, which are modeled by randomly selecting a certain fraction of system components to make them fail (Motter and Lai, ; Crucitti et al., ; Albert et al., ; Yazdani and Jeffrey, ; Dobson et al., ; Ouyang and Dueñas‐Osorio, ; Carreras et al., ; Dobson et al., ; Ren and Dobson, ; Ouyang et al., ; Newman, ; Hong et al., ); (2) natural hazards, whose scenarios are simulated by hazard generation models (FEMA, ) and their impacts on system components are described by fragility curves (Dueñas‐Osorio et al., ; Adachi and Ellingwood, ; Esposito et al., ; Franchin and Cavalieri, ; Cavallaro et al., ; FEMA, ; Ouyang and Dueñas‐Osorio, ); (3) malicious attacks, which are simulated by removing important components (Hines et al., ; Holmgren, ; Rosas‐Casals et al., ; Holme et al., ; Bompard et al., ; Mishkovski et al., ; Zio et al., ; Alderson et al., ; Ouyang et al., ; Wang et al., ; Afshari Rad and Kakhki, ; Hasani and Khosrojerdi, ; Newell, ; Bogloee et al. ); and (4) some combinations of the above events (Levitin and Hausken, ; Levitin, ; Miller‐Hooks et al., ).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%