Vulnerability analysis of elliptic curve cryptography‐based RFID authentication protocols

Abstract

Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), we show that three recently proposed RFID authentication protocols which rely exclusively on the used of Elliptic Curve Cryptography are not secure against the tracking attack. To make this attack successfully, the adversary needs to execute three phases. Firstly, the attacker just eavesdrops on the messages exchanged between Server and Tag. Secondly, the attacker impersonates Server to reply with the same random number that is obtained from previous phase. Finally, the adversary acts as a man in the middle to tamper the exchanged messages. Then, we propose enhancements and prove that the revisions are secure against the tracking attack that keep other security properties. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

A provably secure RFID authentication protocol based on elliptic curve signature with message recovery suitable for m‐Health environments

“…We enumerate the functionalities comparison of the proposed protocol and some other related protocols in Table . Obviously, it can be observed that the proposed scheme can satisfy all the security requirements of the RFID system and is more secure (or with equivalent security performances) than the most recent related protocols . In contrast, according to the recent survey made by He and Zeadally, only 3 recently proposed ECC‐based authentication schemes suitable for the health‐care environment could satisfy all 7 selected security requirements (mutual authentication, confidentiality, anonymity, availability, forward security, scalability, and attack resistance) .…”

A novel anonymous authentication scheme without cryptography

“…For all authorised users, obviously there are m n C m unknown variables (i.e. all elements of A and E y) whereas there are only m n equations in Equation (5). Obviously, there are an infinite number of solutions of A and E y in Equation (5).…”

“…all elements of A and E y) whereas there are only m n equations in Equation (5). Obviously, there are an infinite number of solutions of A and E y in Equation (5). That is, although all authorised users can collude to build the equations of Equation (5), they cannot obtain the right values of A and E y by solving Equation (5) because the number of unknown values is far more than that of known equations.…”

A constant‐time identifying large‐scale RFID tags using lines on a plane

“…There are three roles in a typical RFID system: tags that are embedded in objects to be identified, readers that emit radio signals to interrogate tags and a server that maintains all tags' information, identifies tags and provides services. On the basis of the resource limitation and the operations supported on tags, RFID protocol can be divided into four classes: (i) full-fledged, supporting encryption or public key algorithms [1][2][3][4][5][6], (ii) simple, supporting pseudo random number generator and hash functions [7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18], (iii) lightweight, supporting pseudo random number generator and checksum functions [19], and (iv) ultralightweight, supporting only bitwise operations [20][21][22]. In this paper, our approach makes tags compute nothing but only fetching memory, and the resource cost for such tags is estimated as the cost in simple class.…”