Wage-vacancy contracts and coordination frictions

Jacquet, Nicolas Laurent; Tan, Sabine

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.014

Cited by 17 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…This can be corrected by experience rating (making taxes depend the unemployment a firm causes). It is also corrected without taxes if firms post contracts as in Jacquet and Tan (2012), with one payment to those hired and another to those not hired. Golosov et al (2013) study optimal unemployment insurance (Acemoglu and Shimer 1999 only maximize output).…”

Section: Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Directed Search: A Guided Tour

Wright

Kircher

Julien³

et al. 2017

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This essay surveys the literature on directed/competitive search, covering theory and applications in, e.g., labor, housing and monetary economics. These models share features with traditional search theory, yet differ in important ways. They share features with general equilibrium theory, but with explicit frictions. Equilibria are typically efficient, in part because markets price goods plus the time required to get them. The approach is tractable and arguably realistic. Results are presented for finite and large economies. Private information and sorting with heterogeneity are analyzed. Some evidence is discussed. While emphasizing issues and applications, we also provide several hard-to-find technical results.

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Section: Evidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Directed Search: A Guided Tour

Wright

Kircher

Julien³

et al. 2017

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“…The matching probabilities change when we increase the number of workers , and to make this dependence obvious 17 In principle, a firm could earn maximum profits from several distinct announcements, which is why (13) has a weak inequality. To see that (13) (13) is 1 but the right hand side would have to add to more than 1, violating the requirement that is a probability measure. reflects the expected number of workers at this firm.…”

Section: Competitive Search As a Limitmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The following condition determines whether a 13 In other words, the correspondence (v) is lower hemi-continuous in v.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Game-Theoretic Foundations of Competitive Search Equilibrium

Galenianos

Kircher

2012

SSRN Journal

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We provide a unified directed search framework with general production and matching specifications that encompasses most of the existing literature. We prove the existence of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in pure firm strategies in a finite version of the model.We use this result to derive a more complete characterization of the equilibrium set for the finite economy and to extend convergence results as the economy becomes large to general production and matching specifications. The latter extends the micro-foundations for the standard market-utility assumption used in competitive search models with a continuum of agents to new environments.

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“…Examples of such papers include Julien et al. (), Eeckhout and Kircher (), Virág (), and Jacquet and Tan ().…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Directed Search and the Bertrand Paradox

Geromichalos

2014

International Economic Review

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. I study a directed search model of oligopolistic competition, extended to incorporate general capacity constraints, congestion effects, and pricing based on ex-post realized demand. I show that as long as any one of these ingredients is present, the Bertrand paradox will fail to hold. Hence, I argue that, despite the emphasis that has been placed by the literature on sellers' capacity constraints as a resolution to the paradox, the existence of such constraints is only a subcase of a general class of environments where the paradox fails. More precisely, Bertrand's paradox will not arise whenever the buyers' expected utility from visiting a specific seller is decreasing in that seller's realized demand. Abstract I study a directed search model of oligopolistic competition, extended to incorporate general capacity constraints, congestion effects, and pricing based on ex-post realized demand. I show that as long as any one of these ingredients is present, the Bertrand paradox will fail to hold. Hence, I argue that, despite the emphasis that has been placed by the literature on sellers' capacity constraints as a resolution to the paradox, the existence of such constraints is only a subcase of a general class of environments where the paradox fails. More precisely, Bertrand's paradox will not arise whenever the buyers' expected utility from visiting a specific seller is decreasing in that seller's realized demand. Terms of use: Documents in

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Wage-vacancy contracts and coordination frictions

Cited by 17 publications

References 27 publications

Directed Search: A Guided Tour

Directed Search: A Guided Tour

On the Game-Theoretic Foundations of Competitive Search Equilibrium

Directed Search and the Bertrand Paradox

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