Wages in wage-setting regimes with opening clauses

Heinbach, Wolf Dieter

doi:10.1007/s11943-007-0018-3

Cited by 15 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…In West Germany, there has been a decline in the coverage rate since the late 1990s (Fitzenberger et al, 2008;Schnabel 2005). The trend towards local bargaining was strengthened by the increasing use of opening clauses, allowing for deviations from the terms of the collective contract (Heinbach, 2007). Although German unions have no legally defined participation rights with regard to dismissal protection, the Works Constitution Act gives unions a wide range of information rights and their influence on the election of works councils is high.…”

Section: The Role Of Institutions For Job Durationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Workers, Firms, or Institutions: What Determines Job Duration for Male Employees in Germany?

Boockmann¹,

Steffes²

2010

ILR Review

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp08116.pdf between job-to-job and job-to-unemployment changes. Non-technical summaryKaplan-Meier survivor functions show that more than fifty percent of all new employment relationships end after in the first two years. The estimation results indicate huge differences between individuals but also between establishments with different characteristics. We conclude that persistence in individual mobility behavior is much reduced when firm-level heterogeneity is accounted for. Blue collar workers tend to select into long-tenure firms as compared to white collar workers. Positive effects of works councils and further training on job duration are high for blue collar skilled or semi-skilled workers but non-existent for white collar employees. Competing risks analysis shows that mobility to another job and exit to unemployment follow strikingly different processes. For instance having a university degree lowers the unemployment hazard but increases the likelihood of a job-to-job change. Das Wichtigste in Kürze Abstract:We examine job durations of German workers using linked employer-employee data.Our results indicate that exit rates are strongly influenced by firm characteristics. The effects of some of these characteristics, however, are limited to particular job positions or skill groups. There is clear evidence for a sorting process whereby workers with long expected job durations are matched to firms offering stable employment (and vice versa). An extension of the model to a competing-risks framework shows that both individual and firm-level characteristics differ greatly in their impact on job exit to different destination states. Among the substantive results, it would appear that works councils decrease exit both to unemployment and to new jobs, but do so only for blue collar workers. JEL-Codes: J62, J63, C41

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Section: The Role Of Institutions For Job Durationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Workers, Firms, or Institutions: What Determines Job Duration for Male Employees in Germany?

Boockmann¹,

Steffes²

2010

ILR Review

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“…4 4 Note that many sectoral agreements nowadays include so‐called opening clauses, which enable firms to deviate from the terms of collective agreements in cases of emergency if the respective union and employers association do not veto such a deviation from their contract (for details, see Kohaut and Schnabel, 2007 or Heinbach, 2007). However, for various reasons (such as signalling economic problems to the banks and customers or fearing reduced effort of employees) these opening clauses are not used very often by firms in the case of wages, and they should not be misinterpreted as a second source of wage cushion. …”

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confidence: 99%

Paying More than Necessary? The Wage Cushion in Germany

Jung

Schnabel

2011

Labour

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in

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“…While more than 40 per cent of the establishments did not apply collective agreements in 1999, this percentage increased to around 70 per cent in 2013 (see Gartner et al 2013 andSchnabel 2016). These employers can bargain entry wages with candidates, allowing them to adapt wages to firm-specific conditions (Heinbach 2007).…”

Section: Institutional Framework and The Determination Of Entry Wagesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Workforce Composition and Individual Wages — An Employer–Employee Data Analysis

Niebuhr

Peters

2020

Brit J Industrial Rel

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The study analyses the impact of workforce composition and employee isolation -based on age, gender and citizenship -on entry wages of new employment relationships in German firms using employer-employee data. We allow for heterogeneous effects across distinct groups of workers and include worker and firm fixed effects to account for selection effects and unobserved heterogeneity. The results point to a negative impact of gender and age diversity for males and females, natives and foreigners and workers across the skill spectrum. Only for high-skilled workers, the negative effect of gender diversity is not statistically significant. Females receive, in addition, relatively low entry wages in establishments with a rather old workforce. With regard to the relative position, mainly gender isolation tends to exert an important influence on entry wages. The effect is positive only for females. In contrast, we estimate significant negative wage effects for males, natives, medium-and high-skilled workers. An international background of a firm's workforce and cultural isolation do not appear to generally affect entry wages. IntroductionDemographic change, immigration and the increasing labour market participation of women give rise to significant changes in workforce

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Wages in wage-setting regimes with opening clauses

Abstract: Opening clauses, Collective bargaining, Wage structure , Öffnungsklauseln, Tarifbindung, Lohnstruktur ,

Cited by 15 publications

References 6 publications

Workers, Firms, or Institutions: What Determines Job Duration for Male Employees in Germany?

Workers, Firms, or Institutions: What Determines Job Duration for Male Employees in Germany?

Paying More than Necessary? The Wage Cushion in Germany

Workforce Composition and Individual Wages — An Employer–Employee Data Analysis

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