We use longitudinal methods and universal panel data on 30,000 initially state-owned manufacturing firms in four transition economies to estimate the impact of privatisation on employment and wages. The results consistently reject job losses and never imply large wage cuts from either domestic or foreign privatisation. The domestic privatisation estimates are close to zero for employment; for wages, they are negative but small in magnitude. Estimated foreign privatisation effects are nearly always positive and sometimes large for both outcome variables. We interpret the employment and wage results in terms of underlying scale, productivity and cost effects of privatisation.An extensive theoretical and empirical literature supports the hypothesis that privatisation tends to improve firm performance. The theoretical research elaborates mechanisms through which privatisation may increase efficiency and financial outcomes, and the empirical studies usually report positive impacts, although the estimates vary across countries, performance measures, econometric specifications and new types of owners. In a comprehensive survey of research in the 1990s on privatisation and performance, for instance, Megginson and Netter (2001, p. 381) conclude that privatised firms Ôalmost always become more efficientÕ; and in a meta-analysis of studies in transition economies, Djankov and Murrell (2002, p. 740) find that Ôprivatisation is strongly associated with more enterprise restructuring... .Õ More recently, in a paper using many more firms and longer panel data than had been available to previous researchers, we report positive effects of privatisation on productivity in Hungary and Romania, a weak positive effect in Ukraine, and a slight negative effect in Russia; in all four countries, the estimated effects of privatisation to foreign investors are larger than privatisation to domestic owners. 1 ). Our preferred domestic estimates of the multifactor productivity impact of privatisation lie in the range of 5% to 15% for Hungary, 14% to 24% for Romania, À3% to À5% for Russia, and 2% to 4% for Ukraine; the foreign estimates range from 18% to 55%. Djankov and Murrell (2002) also report larger effects for the Central and East European region compared to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).