Waiting to Persuade

Yıldız, Muhamet

doi:10.2139/ssrn.348181

Cited by 34 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…The second point raises a question that has received a great deal of scholarly attention: why don't litigants bargain to a more efficient outcome? 9 Theorists offer three explanations: hidden information (Nalebuff, 1987; Spier, 1992), divergent expectations (Priest and Klein, 1984; Yildiz, 2004; Galasso, 2007), and asymmetric stakes or positive litigation externalities (Meurer, 1989; Siegelman and Waldfogel, 1999; Lanjouw and Lerner, 1998). Studies of patent litigation typically emphasize the second and third factors, because litigants are often sophisticated parties with detailed knowledge of the relevant technology 10…”

Section: Formal Standards and Ip Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Competing on Standards? Entrepreneurship, Intellectual Property, and Platform Technologies

Simcoe

Graham

Feldman

2009

Economics Manag Strategy

108

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Section: Formal Standards and Ip Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Competing on Standards? Entrepreneurship, Intellectual Property, and Platform Technologies

Simcoe

Graham

Feldman

2009

Economics Manag Strategy

108

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“…4 Other papers featuring a link between current policies and electoral outcomes are Milesi-Ferretti and Spolaore (1994), Bourguignon and Verdier (2000), and Hassler et al (2003). 5 For bargaining models featuring delays, see Kennan and Wilson (1993), Merlo and Wilson (1995), Abreu and Gul (2000), Yildiz (2004), Compte and Jehiel (2004), Ali (2006), Acharya and Ortner (2013), Ortner (2013), or Fanning (2014.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A theory of political gridlock

Ortner

2017

Theoretical Economics

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This paper studies how electoral incentives influence the outcomes of political negotiations. It considers a game between two political parties that have to bargain over which policy to implement. While bargaining, the parties' popularity varies over time. Changes in popularity are partly exogenous and partly driven by the parties' actions. There is an election scheduled at a future date and the party with more popularity at the election date wins the vote. Electoral incentives can have substantial effects on bargaining outcomes. Periods of gridlock may arise when the election is close and parties have similar levels of popularity.

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“…So, at the point of agreement, the bargainers must each be able to make at least one future offer. This stands in contrast to papers with private information (Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2013)) or with overconfidence in the ability to make future offers (Yildiz (2004), Simsek and Yildiz (2014)). 10 It may well be that n(δ N) = 1, implying that there is no delay.…”

Section: Characterizationmentioning

confidence: 81%

Bargaining Under Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Second‐Order Optimism

Friedenberg

2019

ECTA

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This paper shows that bargainers may reach delayed agreements even in environments where there is no uncertainty about payoffs or feasible actions. Under such conditions, delay may arise when bargainers face direct forms of strategic uncertainty—that is, uncertainty about the opponent's play. The paper restricts the nature of this uncertainty in two important ways. First, it assumes on‐path strategic certainty: Bargainers face uncertainty only after surprise moves. Second, it assumes Battigalli and Siniscalchi's (2002) rationality and common strong belief of rationality (RCSBR)—a requirement that bargainers are “strategically sophisticated.” The main result characterizes the set of outcomes consistent with on‐path strategic certainty and RCSBR. It shows that these assumptions allow for delayed agreement, despite the fact that the bargaining environment is one of complete information. The source of delay is second‐order optimism: Bargainers do not put forward “good” offers early in the negotiation process because they fear that doing so will cause the other party to become more optimistic about her future prospects.

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Waiting to Persuade

Cited by 34 publications

References 12 publications

Competing on Standards? Entrepreneurship, Intellectual Property, and Platform Technologies

Competing on Standards? Entrepreneurship, Intellectual Property, and Platform Technologies

A theory of political gridlock

Bargaining Under Strategic Uncertainty: The Role of Second‐Order Optimism

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