Body‐worn cameras may produce varying effects on police behavior, depending on the agency‐specific accountability context in which the technology adoption is embedded. The cameras may encourage coercive police actions when acquired to incentivize performance, such as by protecting officers from false complaints. By contrast, when acquired to enhance procedural accountability, such as by enabling closer scrutiny of officer misconduct, the cameras may discourage coercive police actions. Based on this framework, this study examined the case of the New Orleans Police Department, an agency that implemented a body‐worn camera program to enhance both performance and procedural accountability. Results of Bayesian structural time‐series modeling with synthetic control show that the program increased the number of investigatory stops and follow‐up measures (i.e., frisk, search, citation, arrest) while decreasing the ratio of more‐to‐less coercive measures during stops (i.e., arrest/citation‐to‐warning ratio and search‐to‐frisk ratio). However, the program had a null effect on the minority‐to‐White suspect ratio, despite the agency's bias‐free policing initiative. The percentage of frisks and searches detecting drugs or weapons also declined. A broader implication of the findings is that technology‐based monitoring mechanisms are important, but not a silver bullet for improving the behavior of street‐level bureaucrats.