Walter the Banker: The Conjunction Fallacy Reconsidered

Hartmann, Stephan; Meijs, Wouter

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1415928

Cited by 6 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Major theoretical interpretations postulate that the conjunction fallacy is unquestionably considered a probabilistic error (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, 1983 ; Bar-Hillel and Neter, 1993 ; Costello, 2009 ) or linguistic misapprehension (e.g., Wolford et al, 1990 ; Politzer and Noveck, 1991 ; Hertwig et al, 2008 ; Hartmann and Meijs, 2012 ). For instance, Costello (2009) proposed that participants represent the conjunction as an effect of random error in the judgment process.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is experiential-intuitive cognitive style more inclined to err on conjunction fallacy than analytical-rational cognitive style?

2015

Front. Psychol.

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In terms of prediction by Epstein’s integrative theory of personality, cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST), those people with experiential-intuitive cognitive style are more inclined to induce errors than the other people with analytical-rational cognitive style in the conjunction fallacy (two events that can occur together are seen as more likely than at least one of the two events). We tested this prediction in a revised Linda problem. The results revealed that rational and experiential cognitive styles do not statistically influence the propensity for committing the conjunction fallacy, which is contrary to the CEST’s predictions. Based on the assumption that the rational vs. experiential processing is a personality trait with comparatively stabile specialities, these findings preliminarily indicate that those people who are characterized by “rational thinking” are not more inclined to use Bayes’ deduction than the other people who are labeled by “intuitive thinking” or by “poor thinking.”

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is experiential-intuitive cognitive style more inclined to err on conjunction fallacy than analytical-rational cognitive style?

2015

Front. Psychol.

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“…In the sequel, many other experiments were conducted and proposals were made as to how people reason in such cases. What results is an intricate interplay between mathematical modeling and experimentation which does not occur in this form in the natural sciences (Hertwig et al 2008;Hartmann and Meijs 2010).…”

Section: Methodological Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mathematics and Statistics in the Social Sciences

Hartmann¹,

Sprenger²

2011

The SAGE Handbook of the Philosophy of Social Sciences

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, webpage: www.laeuferpaar.de. 1 In our usage, "social science" includes disciplines such as anthropology, political science, and sociology, but also economics and parts of linguistics and psychology. 5 For a more detailed discussion of modeling in the social sciences, see ch. 29 ("Local models versus global theories, and their assessment") of this handbook. For a general review of models in science, see Frigg and Hartmann (2007). 6 See ch. 15 ("Rational choice and its alternatives") of this handbook. 7 See ch. 16 ("Game theory") of this handbook. 8 See ch. 17 ("Evolutionary approaches") of this handbook. 9 See also ch. 18 ("Networks") of this handbook.

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“…The observed effect has become known as the infamous "conjunction fallacy". For a discussion, see Bovens & Hartmann (2003) and Hartmann & Meijs (2012).…”

Section: Empirical Doubtsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Being Realist about Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of Mind

Colombo¹,

Elkin²,

Hartmann³

2021

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

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Some naturalistic philosophers of mind subscribing to the predictive processing theory of mind have adopted a realist attitude towards the results of Bayesian cognitive science. In this paper, we argue that this realist attitude is unwarranted. The Bayesian research program in cognitive science does not possess special epistemic virtues over alternative approaches for explaining mental phenomena involving uncertainty. In particular, the Bayesian approach is not simpler, more unifying, or more rational than alternatives. It is also contentious that the Bayesian approach is overall better supported by the empirical evidence. So, to develop philosophical theories of mind on the basis of a realist interpretation of results from Bayesian cognitive science is unwarranted. Naturalistic philosophers of mind should adopt instead an anti-realist attitude towards these results and remain agnostic as to whether Bayesian models are true. For continuing on with an exclusive praise of Bayes within debates about the predictive processing theory will impede progress in philosophical understanding of actual scientific practice as well as the architecture of the mind.

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Walter the Banker: The Conjunction Fallacy Reconsidered

Cited by 6 publications

References 16 publications

Is experiential-intuitive cognitive style more inclined to err on conjunction fallacy than analytical-rational cognitive style?

Is experiential-intuitive cognitive style more inclined to err on conjunction fallacy than analytical-rational cognitive style?

Mathematics and Statistics in the Social Sciences

Being Realist about Bayes, and the Predictive Processing Theory of Mind

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