These books are about power transitions in the Western experience, and collectively they represent a good cross-section of the best mainstream scholarship about power transitions. However, when Japan, China, or non-Western cases are involved, it is almost exclusively in the context of the twentieth century and in relation to Western powers (e.g., Goddard, chapter 6). As a result, this is an awkward review to write. I am being asked to assess four books based not on what they tried to do, but on what they did not try to do: actually research China. The insights thus are about what might be expected: if China acts "as if" it were an eighteenth-century European power, then we can expect it to behave like … an eighteenth-century European power. Yet in extending their findings to the current era, none of these books examine Chinese interests, perceptions, goals, identity, history, religion, culture, and philosophy-or even capabilities, domestic politics, or its economyin any depth. None explore East Asia as a region and China's place in it. If identity, culture, and ideas, or even the domestic politics and business of a country, have even a marginal impact on the behavior and perceptions of actors in international politics-and a wide swath of the IR profession, along with MacDonald and Parent, Goddard, and Schake, clearly believes that they do-then we cannot expect the books under review to tell us much about China and power transitions. Rather, China and East Asia serve as empty vessels-as Rorschach tests-into which we can put whatever ideas, assumptions, fears, and guesses we wish. This review will thus interrogate one central question: are the contours of power transitions universal? To answer this requires addressing two additional questions about power transitions specifically and how we research East Asia more generally. Are we all Westphalian now? And what does China want? For arguments about power transitions to be widely applicable, states all around the globe would have to react the same way to changes in relative power. Yet changes in states' goals must also be opaque-it is the potential for unlimited appetite that drives fears during power transitions. Most IR scholars would probably assume that "yes," all states are Westphalian, and "no," we have no idea what China's aims are. Yet a closer examination of China and the East Asian region itself would likely yield the opposite answers: no, all states are not Westphalian beyond the most superficial elements; and Book Reviews 135