While the debate on the role of war in state development in early modern Europe has ranged widely, the participants have not answered its most fundamental question to the satisfaction of most historians. The difficulty has been how to assess whether war was more important than other factors as a driver of state formation. In practice it is more fruitful to study the role of war within a multi-causal model, but to do this the interaction between war and other factors such as judicial, religious, ideological, and social change must be studied, preferably in detail but in comparative context. A t first sight it might be thought that the debate on the role of war in state development in early modern Europe is quite wide enough already. It crosses the disciplinary boundaries between history, sociology, and political science. It subsumes the ever more ramified debate on the 'military revolution' thesis first propounded by Michael Roberts in 1955 and elaborated by Geoffrey Parker in 1988. 1 It has spread its influence geographically: from at least Parker's intervention it has been tied to the origins of European global dominance, and recently attention has been focused on what eastern European developments can tell us that western European cannot, and on why China did not have the same sort of state-building military revolution as Europe. 2 Discussion has drawn in the fourteenth century as the proposed site for an infantry revolution, the fifteenth century as the scene of a gunpowder revolution, the later seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries as the locus for a more convincing all-round military revolution than Roberts's, and the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries as the 1 M.