Warrant and action

Abstract

I develop an approach to action and practical deliberation according to which the degree of epistemic warrant required for practical rationality varies with practical context. In some contexts of practical deliberation, very strong warrant is called for. In others, less will do. I set forth a warrant account, (WA), that captures this idea. I develop and defend (WA) by arguing that it is more promising than a competing knowledge account of action due to John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley. I argue that cases of warranted false belief speak in favor of (WA) and against the knowledge account. Moreover, I note some problems with an "excuse maneuver" that proponents of the knowledge account frequently invoke in response to cases of warranted false belief. Finally, I argue that (WA) may provide a strict invariantist account of cases that have been thought to motivate interest-relative or subject-sensitive theories of knowledge and warrant.

Epistemic Focal Bias

“…Such a psychological mechanism is not altogether out of sync with the epistemic norms of action[Gerken 2011]. Downloaded by [University of South Dakota] at 02:10 27 December 2014 Epistemic Focal Bias 53…”

Knowledge and Attributability

“…This calls for a worked out explanation or theory of what excuses specific agents under what circumstances. And there have been multiple attempts at this recently (Littlejohn, forthcoming; Williamson, forthcoming; see also DeRose, ; Lackey, ; Gerken, ). We should then compare this sort of explanation with the presumably simpler explanation that the norm of belief has not been violated.…”

“…First, I argue that ways of motivating (TS) that appeal to the blamelessness principle lead to an impasse between proponents of the knowledge norm and proponents of weaker views. They lead to an impasse when knowledge normers invoke the notion of an excuse to explain away a prima facie connection between blamelessness and justified belief (Littlejohn, forthcoming ; Williamson, forthcoming; see also DeRose, ; Lackey, ; Gerken, ; McGlynn, ). Second, I argue that a way out of this impasse becomes available when we take a closer look at some distinctions in the theory of responsibility.…”

Know Your Rights: On Warranted Assertion and Truth

“…It seems to many that we need knowledge-level evidence for warranted assertion and it's not at all clear how the truth-first approach can account for the fact (assuming that it is one) that this is the kind of evidence we need to conform to EN. 4 The third is that it's not clear that this approach can explain why challenges in which we question whether the speaker has knowledge have the force that they appear to. 5 If the advocates of the truth-first approach cannot account for the data, they can try to explain it away.…”