Wars, Presidents, and Popularity: The Political Cost(s) of War Re-Examined

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Extensive research demonstrates that war casualties depress incumbent popularity. The present study argues that analyses of the political costs of warfare should also account for the financial toll of wars since a) financial costs of wars are substantial, b) these costs are publicly observed and understood and c) fiscal policy affects incumbents' approval ratings. Empirical evidence based on US data for the 1948-2008 period supports this theoretical claim: pecuniary costs of warfare either directly affect presidential popularity (e.g., in the Korean War) or their inclusion affects the predicted political cost of war casualties (e.g., in the Korean and Iraq/Afghanistan Wars). Interestingly, the adverse effect of war-spending is strongest under favourable economic conditions (i.e. low unemployment). Terms of use: Documents in

Value for money? German local government efficiency in a comparative perspective

“…The literature on vote and popularity functions, for example, clearly illustrates that taxation has a significant political cost for incumbents in the sense that it reduces their popularity or re-election odds (e.g., Niskanen, 1975;Peltzman, 1992;Vermeir and Heyndels, 2006;Geys and Vermeir, 2008a, b;Geys, 2010). This desire for public goods but reluctance to pay for them suggests that an efficient provision of public goods and services -understood in terms of a maximum amount of public good provision at given (fiscal) costs (or 'value for money') -is likely to win voters' hearts.…”

Self-interest, partisanship, and the conditional influence of taxation on support for war in the USA

“…On the costs side of the ledger, most prior scholarship has focused almost exclusively on the critical importance of combat casualties in these calculations (Althaus et al, 2012;Gartner, 2008;Gartner and Segura, 1998;Kriner and Shen, 2010;Larson, 1996;Mueller, 1973;Voeten and Brewer, 2006). In contrast, comparatively few studies have examined how the financial costs of military action affect public support for war (although see Berinsky, 2007;Geys, 2010). Even fewer scholars have examined how the instrument chosen by political leaders to raise the requisite capital-be it varying forms of taxation or deficit spending-influences support for war.…”

Local Government Efficiency in German Municipalities

“…Indeed, there is a significant political cost of taxation in the sense that it reduces politicians' popularity or re-election odds (e.g., Niskanen, 1975;Peltzman, 1992;Vermeir and Heyndels, 2006;Geys and Vermeir, 2008a, b;Geys, 2010). Yet, the public goods provided as a result of tax revenues are commonly appreciated.…”