Was privateering plunder efficient?

Leeson, Peter T.; Nowrasteh, Alex

doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2011.02.009

Cited by 15 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 46 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Ransoms are negotiated under asymmetric information: kidnappers do not know who pays the ransom (family, firm, insurer, or government)—or the financial position of these entities. This is very different from the efficient plunder contracts studied by Leeson and Nowrasteh (), where the approximate market value of ships and cargoes was common knowledge. In the absence of detailed information, kidnappers base their ransom expectations for specific “victim types” on easily verifiable characteristics and past ransoms for that “type.” Interviews with professional ransom negotiators and victim stakeholders indicate that for most negotiations the “target settlement price” and negotiation duration are fairly clear from the outset (Interviews IV, V, X, XI; XIII, XIV; March, ).…”

Section: Ransom Disciplinecontrasting

confidence: 58%

“…Ransoms are negotiated under asymmetric information: kidnappers do not know who pays the ransom (family, firm, insurer, or government)-or the financial position of these entities. This is very different from the efficient plunder contracts studied by Leeson and Nowrasteh (2011), where the approximate market value of ships and cargoes was common knowledge. In the absence of detailed information, kidnappers base their ransom expectations for specific "victim types" on easily verifiable characteristics and past ransoms for that "type."…”

Section: Ra Nsom D Isciplin Ementioning

confidence: 58%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Governing kidnap for ransom: Lloyd's as a “private regime”

Shortland

2016

Governance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Kidnap for ransom raises significant governance challenges. In the absence of formal regulation and enforcement, insurers have created an effective private governance regime to facilitate smooth commercial resolutions. Controlling ransoms is paramount: “supernormal” profits for kidnappers create kidnapping booms and undermine the market for insurance. Ransom control requires cooperation, but there are high transactions costs in enforcing a collusive agreement. The Coasean prediction is that a single firm will form to internalize the externalities arising from lax insurance and mismanaged ransom negotiations—or a government must order the market. There is indeed a single source of kidnap insurance: Lloyd's of London. Yet, within the Lloyd's market several insurers compete for business. Lloyd's is a club providing private governance: Its members issue standard contracts, follow the same regime for kidnap resolution, and exchange information to stabilize ransoms. Lloyd's, therefore, combines aspects of Coase's “single firm” and “government” solution to the externalities problem.

show abstract

Section: Ransom Disciplinecontrasting

confidence: 58%

Section: Ra Nsom D Isciplin Ementioning

confidence: 58%

Governing kidnap for ransom: Lloyd's as a “private regime”

Shortland

2016

Governance

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Though, see Leeson and Nowrasteh (2011). i's curses threaten j with terrible afflictions. If j is certain that i's curses are genuine, those afflictions impose a cost on j, z, where x > z > x À c. But j needn't be certain that i's curses are genuine.…”

Section: The Option To Cursementioning

confidence: 99%

"God Damn": The Law and Economics of Monastic Malediction

Leeson

2012

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Today monks are known for turning the other cheek, honoring saints, and blessing humanity with brotherly love. But for centuries they were known equally for fulminating their foes, humiliating saints, and casting calamitous curses at persons who crossed them. Clerics called these curses "maledictions." This article argues that medieval communities of monks and canons used maledictions to protect their property against predators where government and physical self-help were unavailable to them. To explain how they did this I develop a theory of cursing with rational agents. I show that curses capable of improving property protection when cursors and their targets are rational must satisfy three conditions. They must be grounded in targets' existing beliefs, monopolized by cursors, and unfalsifiable. Malediction satisfied these conditions, making it an effective institutional substitute for conventional institutions of clerical property protection. (JEL D83, K11, K42, K49, N43, Z12) Whoever wishes to know what the malediction is really like should read . . . divine law and find out for certain how terrible and horrible and frightening that malediction is.-Council of Aachen to Pepin of Aquitaine, 837 AD 1

show abstract

“…For kapere som opererte i kystnaere områder var dette også mønsteret for hvordan kaperiet foregikk. Kapere som opererte på åpent hav hadde imidlertid både andre insentiver og andre muligheter (Leeson & Nowrasteh 2011). Hvis man var langt hjemmefra, kunne det vaere både farlig og ineffektivt å bringe prisen til havn.…”

Section: Kapervirksomhetens Historie Og Karakterunclassified

Kaperne kommer!

Leira¹

2011

Internasjonal Politikk

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Was privateering plunder efficient?

Cited by 15 publications

References 46 publications

Governing kidnap for ransom: Lloyd's as a “private regime”

Governing kidnap for ransom: Lloyd's as a “private regime”

"God Damn": The Law and Economics of Monastic Malediction

Kaperne kommer!

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About