Was <scp>M</scp>ill a Noncognitivist?

Macleod, Christopher

doi:10.1111/sjp.12011

“…Against the non-cognitivist reading of Ryan and West, Christopher Macleod argues not for a cognitivist interpretation but an agnostic one: 'I do not believe there is a safe reading of Mill's metaethics on the basis of textual evidence.' 75 Macleod gives several reasons why the non-cognitivist interpretation should not be accepted.…”

Section: Ryan's Position Is Supported By Henry Westmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One such reason is that ascribing non-cognitivism to Mill is anachronistic. 76 This objection might be justified if the ascription in question uses the term non-cognitivism with all the implications of its modern usage; Mill did not think in modern metaethical terms. It seems reasonable, however, to use current terminology for convenience.…”

Section: Ryan's Position Is Supported By Henry Westmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Humean Constructivist Reading of J. S. Mill's Utilitarian Theory

Drake¹

2015

Utilitas

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There is a common view that the utilitarian theory of John Stuart Mill is morally realist and involves a strong kind of practical obligation. This article argues for two negative theses and a positive thesis. The negative theses are that Mill is not a moral realist and that he does not believe in certain kinds of obligations, those involving external reasons and those I call robust obligations, obligations with a particular, strong kind of practical authority. The positive thesis is that Mill's metaethical position can be interpreted as a Humean constructivist view, a metaethical view that is constructivist about value and entails the existence of practical reasons, but not external reasons or robust obligations. I argue that a Humean constructivist reading of Mill's theory is reasonable, and strengthens Mill's argument from desire for the value of happiness, an important but notoriously weak aspect of his theory.

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“…The argument that Mill is a noncognitivist has been made by several scholars, notably Alan Ryan: 41 40 This section is indebted to Christopher Macleod's (2013) argument against a noncognitivist reading of Mill. 41 Ryan, and Henry West after him, do not use the term noncognitivism or refer to Mill as a noncognitivist, but that Mill is a noncognitivist seems the only reasonable interpretation of their position on his view of moral language.…”

Section: Mill's Noncognitivismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Prosociality without morality: A Humean constructivist approach to prosocial practical reason for moral skeptics

Drake¹

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<p>The moral skeptic frequently encounters the view that without a belief in moral facts she has insufficient justification for acting in prosocial ways, such as acting with concern for the interests or welfare of others. This thesis is an argument against that view. The thesis is in two parts, each employing a different type of philosophy. Part one is empirical philosophy, and draws on evidence from psychology and history to show that morality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of prosociality, and may in fact be an obstacle to it. Part two is in the fields of metaethics and practical reason, and addresses the question of how a moral skeptic can employ rationality to develop robust, stable, and coherent practical reasons for prosociality. I argue that this can be done by employing a Humean constructivist view. Finally, I use John Stuart Mill as a case study, arguing that he is a noncognitivist and thus a moral skeptic, and that a Humean constructivist reading of his utilitarian theory accounts for the harmony between his moral skepticism and his prosocial normative theory. Mill thus offers an example of prosociality and moral skepticism within a Humean constructivist framework.</p>

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“…The argument that Mill is a noncognitivist has been made by several scholars, notably Alan Ryan: 41 40 This section is indebted to Christopher Macleod's (2013) argument against a noncognitivist reading of Mill. 41 Ryan, and Henry West after him, do not use the term noncognitivism or refer to Mill as a noncognitivist, but that Mill is a noncognitivist seems the only reasonable interpretation of their position on his view of moral language.…”

Section: Mill's Noncognitivismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Prosociality without morality: A Humean constructivist approach to prosocial practical reason for moral skeptics

Drake¹

0

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

<p>The moral skeptic frequently encounters the view that without a belief in moral facts she has insufficient justification for acting in prosocial ways, such as acting with concern for the interests or welfare of others. This thesis is an argument against that view. The thesis is in two parts, each employing a different type of philosophy. Part one is empirical philosophy, and draws on evidence from psychology and history to show that morality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of prosociality, and may in fact be an obstacle to it. Part two is in the fields of metaethics and practical reason, and addresses the question of how a moral skeptic can employ rationality to develop robust, stable, and coherent practical reasons for prosociality. I argue that this can be done by employing a Humean constructivist view. Finally, I use John Stuart Mill as a case study, arguing that he is a noncognitivist and thus a moral skeptic, and that a Humean constructivist reading of his utilitarian theory accounts for the harmony between his moral skepticism and his prosocial normative theory. Mill thus offers an example of prosociality and moral skepticism within a Humean constructivist framework.</p>

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Was Mill a Noncognitivist?

Cited by 12 publications

References 4 publications

A Humean Constructivist Reading of J. S. Mill's Utilitarian Theory

A Humean Constructivist Reading of J. S. Mill's Utilitarian Theory

Prosociality without morality: A Humean constructivist approach to prosocial practical reason for moral skeptics

Prosociality without morality: A Humean constructivist approach to prosocial practical reason for moral skeptics

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