Was sind die richtigen Rentenabschläge? – neue Perspektiven

Gasche, Martin

doi:10.1515/roe-2012-0205

Cited by 6 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…4 The determination of the discount rate δ is a crucial issue. In fact, it will turn out that different approaches to calculate appropriate deductions differ primarily in their choice of the discount rate (see also Gasche 2012). If the costs of early retirement have to be financed by debt then the market interest rate seems to be the right choice, i.e.…”

Section: Deductions For a General Discount Ratementioning

confidence: 99%

“…(2003)]. Overviews of the debate can be found in Börsch-Supan (2004) and Gasche (2012). The latter, e.g., has shown that the main difference between the two concepts of incentive neutral and budget neutral adjustment rates is the choice of the underlying discount rate, where a risk-free rate is the appropriate choice for the first and the IRR for the second concept.…”

Section: Related Literature and Main Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This case is dominant in the related literature on actuarial deductions [Börsch-Supan (2004), Werding (2007), Gasche (2012), Freudenberg et al . (2018)].…”

Section: Budget-neutral Deductionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A number of researchers have supported higher rates of deductions based on market interest rates (Börsch-Supan & Schnabel 1998, Fenge & Pestieau 2005, Werding 2007, Brunner & Hoffmann 2010 while other participants have argued for keeping rates low stressing the lower IRR of the PAYG system (Ohsmann et al 2003). Overviews of the debate can be found in Börsch-Supan (2004) and Gasche (2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Actuarial deductions for early retirement

Knell

2021

J. Dem. Econ.

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This paper studies how the rates of deduction for early retirement have to be determined in pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems in order to keep their budget stable. The derivation of these deductions requires the use of a multiperiod intertemporal budget constraint that involves assumptions about the retirement behavior of past, present, and future cohorts. In general, it is not possible to calculate budget-neutral deductions from the budget constraint of a single individual who retires before the target retirement age—an approach that dominates the related literature. Only for specific cases one can use this second approach but then one has to adjust the discount rate to the assumption about collective retirement. If there is only one deviating individual, then the right choice is the market interest rate while for a stationary retirement distribution it is the internal rate of return of the PAYG system. In this case, the necessary deductions are lower than under the standard approach. This is also true for retirement ages that fluctuate randomly around a stationary distribution. Various long-run developments (e.g., increases in life expectancy or permanent changes in the average retirement age) might cause challenges for the sustainability of the pension system. These developments, however, can only be dealt with by adequate adjustments to the basic pension formulas and not by the use of deduction rates.

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Section: Deductions For a General Discount Ratementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Related Literature and Main Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This case is dominant in the related literature on actuarial deductions [Börsch-Supan (2004), Werding (2007), Gasche (2012), Freudenberg et al . (2018)].…”

Section: Budget-neutral Deductionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Actuarial deductions for early retirement

Knell

2021

J. Dem. Econ.

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“…If an individual's choice of claiming age should be neutral to the sustainability of the pension system, these adjustment factors must be actuarially neutral, i.e., they should equalize the present discounted value of pension benefits across all permissible claiming ages. Depending on age and life expectancy, actuarial adjustment rates are between 6.5 and 8 percent (Börsch-Supan, 2004;Queisser & Whitehouse, 2006;Werding, 2007 andGasche, 2012;OECD, 2015). In most European countries, however, they are substantially lower (Table 1).…”

Section: New Zealandmentioning

confidence: 99%

Earnings Test, Non-actuarial Adjustments and Flexible Retirement

Axel¹,

Härtl²,

Leite³

2018

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We are grateful to Alexander Ludwig for advice on the computational algorithm. We thank Tabea ABSTRACTIn response to the challenges of increasing longevity, an obvious policy response is to gradually increase the statutory eligibility age for public pension benefits and to shut down pathways to early retirement such as special rules for women. This is, however, very unpopular. As an alternative, many countries have introduced "flexibility reforms" which allow combining parttime work and partial retirement. A key measure of these reforms is the abolishment of earnings tests. It is claimed that these reforms increase labor supply and therefore, also the sustainability of pension systems. We show that these claims may not be true in the circumstances of most European countries.To this end, we employ a life-cycle model of consumption and labor supply where the choices of labor force exit and benefit claiming age are endogenous and potentially separate. Earnings tests force workers to exit the labor market when claiming a pension. After abolishing the earnings test, workers can claim their benefits and can keep on working, potentially increasing labor supply. Our key result is that the difference between exit and claiming age strongly depends on the actuarial neutrality of the pension system and can become very large. Abolishing an earnings test as part of a "flexibility reform" may therefore create more labor supply but at the same time, reduce the average claiming age when adjustments remain less than actuarial, thereby worsening rather than improving the sustainability of public pension systems.

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Einkommensheterogenität und Rentenprognosen

Rausch¹

2023

Perspektiven Der Wirtschaftspolitik

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Zusammenfassung Simulationsmodelle der Gesetzlichen Rentenversicherung (GRV) berücksichtigen die Heterogenität des Versichertenbestandes bisher kaum. Insbesondere die Einkommensheterogenität blieb bislang außen vor. In diesem Beitrag erweitert Johannes Rausch daher zunächst das Rentensimulationsmodell MEA-PENSIM um eine differenzierte Betrachtung der Einkommenssituationen, um anschließend deren Bedeutung für die künftige Entwicklung der GRV anhand von ausgewählten Anwendungen zu bewerten. Dies umfasst unter anderem die Betrachtung einkommensspezifischer Lebenserwartungen, einkommensabhängiger Ersatzraten sowie einer Kaufkraftdynamisierung der Bestandsrenten. Die Einkommensdifferenzierung erfolgt anhand administrativer Daten der GRV. Es zeigt sich, dass die Berücksichtigung einkommensspezifischer Unterschiede (beispielsweise hinsichtlich des Renteneintrittsverhaltens) die Modellgüte erhöht. Darüber hinaus liefert die differenziertere Betrachtung zusätzliche Erkenntnisse, insbesondere zu den Ersatzraten der unteren Einkommensgruppen. Ganz allgemein kann das Modell nun die Verteilungseffekte von Rentenreformen simulieren. Das gilt besonders für die Bewertung von Reformen, die das Äquivalenzprinzip durch mehr Umverteilung aufweichen.

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Was sind die richtigen Rentenabschläge? – neue Perspektiven

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

Actuarial deductions for early retirement

Actuarial deductions for early retirement

Earnings Test, Non-actuarial Adjustments and Flexible Retirement

Einkommensheterogenität und Rentenprognosen

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