Watching EU watchdogs assessing the accountability powers of the European Court of auditors and the European Ombudsman

Abstract

The paper provides a comprehensive assessment of the accountability capacity of the two main EU watchdog institutions. The overarching research question is: how powerful are these watchdog institutions in holding the EU executive to account? The paper presents an expanded analysis of the formal and organisational accountability powers of these EU watchdogs and how these are exercised, based on an indepth case study. We apply an assessment framework of accountability powers developed previously. Both watchdogs have comparable formal powers when it comes to accountability. Despite these similarities, the EO and the ECA differ in their organisational power and in the exercise of their powers. In the organizational dimension, there are differences regarding leadership. In the exercise of power dimension, the EO has increasingly developed standards for good practice with an emphasis on transparency and principles of good administrative behavior, while also using its networks to further improve complaint handling.

Account‐Holding Intensity in the EU Accountability Landscape: A Comprehensive Review of EU agencies' Institutional Accountability Relationships*

“…This should increase optimism that MBs can effectively serve as linchpins between EU governance and democratic institutions at the national level (see Buess, 2015 ). Additionally, the European Ombudsman is, in contrast to findings from prior studies (for example Wille and Bovens, 2020 ), found to be a largely passive account‐holder. However, our interview findings indicate that this is a function of its institutional nature.…”

“…Similarly to the European Court of Auditors, the European Ombudsman has also been described to perform its account‐holding activities vis‐à‐vis EU agencies diligently (Busuioc, 2013 ), exercising its accountability powers with credibility, creativity, visibility and impact (Wille and Bovens, 2020 ). Like the ECA, the EO has been noted to have increased its account‐holding activity during its lifespan, launching an increasing number of investigations (Wille, 2016 ).…”

“…Among those account‐holders are multiple principals: the European Commission (EC), the European Parliament (EP), and the Council of the European Union (Council) (Dehousse, 2008 ). In addition, EU agencies are governed by Management Boards (MBs) (Busuioc, 2012 ), as well as subject to scrutiny from the EU's ‘watchdog institutions’: the European Court of Auditors (ECA) and the European Ombudsman (EO) (Wille and Bovens, 2020 ).…”

Rethinking Higher Education Services and the Complaint Handling Framework in Malaysia

“…These qualities are mostly referred to as core principles of operation for Ombudsman offices. An Ombudsman Office is traditionally a watchdog for public offices and government institutions (Wille & Bovens, 2020). Nemo dat quod habet is a latin maxim which means "you cannot give what you do not have".…”

Independencia en auditoría. En pro de la defensa del interés público

“…A lo largo de los últimos años los debates alrededor de la auditoría han sido interesantes y jugosos. La importancia del papel social de la auditoría se ha puesto de manifiesto en temas tan relevantes como otorgar credibilidad a la información financiera, informar sobre los riesgos más significativos en los negocios, detectar incorrecciones materiales contables o pronunciarse sobre si la información financiera corporativa refleja su imagen fiel (Kells, 2011;Seebeck y Devrimi, 2022;Skaerbaek, 2009;Wille y Bovens, 2022). Y ¿por qué razón la labor del auditor es tan significativa?…”